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Abstract 
Social investment has become a widely debated topic in the comparative welfare state literature. 
To date, there are, however, only a couple of systematic comparative empirical analyses that 
focus on the employment outcomes associated with social investment. This study contributes 
to the social investment literature by empirically analysing the extent to which variation in 
employment outcomes across 26 OECD countries over the period 1990-2010 can be explained 
by effort on five social investment policies using time-series cross-sectional analyses. Apart 
from focusing on employment rates, we additionally explore associations with qualitative 
aspects of the employment outcomes relying on novel indicators. The analyses account for 
theoretically relevant confounding variables that were omitted in existing studies, notably 
labour market institutions. We find robust evidence for a positive association between effort on 
active labour market policies and employment rates. For other policies we obtain mixed results, 
dependent on the employment outcome being studied. Subsequently, we explore the role of 
policy and institutional complementarities in the assessment of the employment effects of social 
investment policies. We show how social investment policies interact and how their effect is 
moderated by effort on other policies. Additionally, our analysis shows that the 
complementarity of social investment policies varies across welfare state regimes. Finally, 
explorative analyses suggest that there are positive synergies between more and better jobs, 
which could in part be attributable to effort on social investment. 
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1. Introduction 
For over twenty years, realising higher levels of employment has been at the heart of EU 
strategies such as the European Employment Strategy (1997), Lisbon Strategy (2000) and 
Europe 2020 (2010). In 2011, Vandenbroucke et al. (2011) claimed that in order to attain such 
employment and productivity growth, a social investment perspective on social policy was 
required. To realise these goals, the European Commission launched the Social Investment 
Package in 2013. In it, the European Commission advocated a ‘new approach’, which involves 
“investing in social policies, services and cash benefits which both activate and enable” (2013, 
p. 10). Specifically, the Commission urged member states to “better reflect social investment 
in the allocation of resources [by] putting greater focus on policies such as (child)care, 
education, trainings, active labour market policies, housing support, rehabilitation and health 
services” (2013, p. 9). This strategy is in line with the broader academic discourse on the 
sustainability of the welfare state and future of social policy, which describes the need of 
reorienting social policy towards programmes aimed at activation and human capital 
development in order to prepare individuals for the new social risks of the service-based 
economy (Iversen and Wren 1998; Armingeon and Bonoli 2006; Bonoli 2013; Hemerijck 
2013).  
 Even though social investment has been presented as a promising strategy to raise 
employment, reduce poverty and realise economic growth, it is likely to entail political 
challenges with regard to the actual reallocation of public resources. Because of that, most 
studies have focused on the extent to which social investment policies have actually been 
adopted across different welfare states (Hudson and Kühner 2009; Hemerijck 2013; Kvist 2013; 
Kuitto 2016; Ronchi 2018). Systematic comparative analyses of the outcomes of social 
investment policies that, unlike country-case studies and policy-specific studies, enable one to 
control for confounding factors are limited. They have either focused on redistributive effects 
(Van Vliet and Wang 2015; Noël 2018) or study the relationship with employment by making 
pooled comparisons between countries (Nelson and Stephens 2012; Taylor-Gooby et al. 2015). 
Nevertheless, expenditures on social investment and employment rates display similar 
trajectories over the period 1990-2010 in most OECD countries (see Figure A1). Although 
developments in employment are largely driven by the state of the economy, employment trends 
are also affected by changes in social policy. For OECD countries we indeed find a positive 
cross-country correlation between expenditures on social investment and employment over 
time (r = 0.50; p < 0.01; see Figure A2).  
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In this paper we further probe the relationship between social investment and 
employment outcomes using pooled time-series cross-section regression analyses based on a 
within-country design. To date, there are only two studies that systematically analyse whether 
the evolution of expenditures on social investment policies within countries over time affects 
employment. Nevertheless, these studies have focused on only a brief selection of social 
investment policies (Hemerijck et al. 2016) or considered overall spending on services (Ahn 
and Kim 2015), making it hard or even impossible to consider the effectiveness of different 
individual policies provided through both cash benefits and services. Moreover, most empirical 
studies have not accounted for policy complementarities, whilst it has been stressed in the social 
investment literature that the outcomes of policies depend on their complementarity and the 
institutional context (e.g. Bouget et al. 2015; Hemerijck et al. 2016; Dräbing and Nelson 2017).  
In addition, there has been increasing interest in more qualitative aspects of the 
employment outcomes realised. While the realisation of not just more, but also better jobs has 
been on the policy agenda for over twenty years (e.g. European Council 2000; OECD 2003; 
2014a; 2018a; 2019), it has hardly figured as subject of study within the literature on social 
investment. To the best of our knowledge, Nelson and Stephens (2012) are the only scholars 
who examine whether social investment is capable of producing high-quality jobs. In this study, 
we also examine whether effort on social investment policies is associated with betters jobs.  
In sum, this study aims to complement the aforementioned studies as well as country-
case studies and policy-specific studies by empirically analysing the association between effort 
on social investment policies and employment outcomes in 26 OECD countries over the period 
1990-2010. As such, it seeks to make three contributions. First, we estimate the employment 
effects of five social investment policies widely discussed in the social investment literature: 
active labour market policies (ALMPs), care for the elderly and frail, early childhood policies, 
education, and maternity and parental leave. We account for the role of other labour market 
policies and institutions that figure prominently in the literature on employment but were not 
or only partly incorporated in the aforementioned studies, such as unemployment benefits, 
employment protection legislation, trade union density, and income taxes (Bradley and 
Stephens 2007). Second, the study examines the role of policy complementarities and 
institutional complementarity in the assessment of the employment outcomes of social 
investment policies. Third, the study explores whether there are any signs of positive synergies 
between more and better jobs.  
We find that there is significant heterogeneity between these policies with regard to the 
employment outcomes, which has important implications for the understanding of social 
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investment policy development. Further, we show that the effect of specific policies on 
employment is moderated by effort on other policies and that the complementarity of policies 
varies across welfare state regimes. Using several proxies for job quality we additionally find 
that there are signs of positive synergies between more and better jobs, which could in part be 
attributable to effort on some of the social investment policies. 
 
2. Literature review and theory 
2.1 Literature on the social investment state and social investment policies 
Throughout the 1990s, social investment arose as a product of new ideas regarding the role of 
social policy and its relation to the economy. While it largely departed from deregulatory 
economic thinking dominant throughout the 1980s and 1990s, it to some extent also reflects its 
critique on the post-war welfare state for its focus on redistributive and passive social policies. 
The term social investment state was first coined by Antony Giddens (1998) who advocated a 
‘Third Way’ that synthesises ‘neoliberalism’ and the post-war welfare state. This was to be 
realised through a shift from protecting people against labour market risks to integrating people 
into the labour market and creating a society of ‘responsible risk takers’. Welfare expenditures 
ought to be concentrated on human capital investment and governments should emphasise life-
long education to develop cognitive and emotional competence: “The guideline is investment 
in human capital wherever possible, rather than in the direct provision of economic 
maintenance. In place of the welfare state we should put the social investment state, operating 
in the context of a positive welfare society” (Giddens 1998, p. 117 – emphasis added).  
Another early pioneer concerns James Midgley (1999; Midgley and Tang 2001), who 
argued that unlike traditional redistributive social welfare, social investment or development(al) 
welfare is capable of fostering economic growth by generating positive rates of return to the 
economy. This requires a focus on programmes that enhance human capital and facilitate and 
enable economic and social inclusion, such as investments in human capital, employment 
programmes and the removal of barriers to economic participation. In contrast to the neoliberal 
view, which generally considers social policy a rigidity that impedes employment and economic 
growth and therefore requires retrenchment, advocates of social investment see social policies 
as a productive factor.  
This view is also reflected in more recent literature on social investment. The social 
investment state has, for example, been defined as “an institution that puts the emphasis less on 
income replacement and more on the promotion of labour market participation through 
activation and investment in human capital” (Bonoli and Natali 2012, p. 9). Instead of a safety 
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net, it provides a ‘trampoline’ (Jenson and Saint-Martin 2003) that involves policies aimed at 
preparing individuals, families and societies to respond to the new risks of the competitive 
knowledge economy, rather than policies aimed at repairing damages after the occurrence of 
personal or economic crises (Morel et al. 2012; Hemerijck et al. 2016). Accordingly, the social 
investment approach has been formulated in terms of the reallocation of expenditures on passive 
transfers to expenditures on activating and capacitating policies such as education, life-long 
learning, and ALMPs (Esping-Andersen et al. 2002; Armingeon and Bonoli 2006).4 
Consequently, most empirical studies have tended to exclusively concentrate on ALMPs and 
early childhood education and care (ECEC) (Bonoli 2013; Hemerijck et al. 2016), although 
some have also considered additional policies such as education (Nelson and Stephens 2012) 
and parental leave and life-long learning (Taylor-Gooby et al. 2015). Moreover, the focus of 
these studies has predominantly been confined to European and OECD countries. 
More recently, scholars have also started to focus on social investment initiatives 
outside of Europe and the OECD in regions such as Latin America, the Caribbean, and (South-
East) Asia (e.g. Jenson 2010; Garritzmann et al. 2017; forthcoming; Midgley et al. 2017). This 
expansion in the number of countries studied inevitably entailed a broadening of the scope of 
policies considered social investments. While a lot of social investment policies in Europe are 
provided through services, conditional cash transfers are for instance common social 
programmes to mitigate poverty and develop human capital in Latin America (e.g. Valencia 
Lomelí 2008). More broadly, social investment is therefore also understood as a future-oriented 
approach that aims to prepare, support, and equip individuals in a way that increases their 
chance to participate in the knowledge-based economy and reduces their future risks of income 
loss and poverty by creating, mobilising and preserving skills and human capital (Garritzmann 
et al. 2017 pp. 36-39; cf. De Deken 2014; Kvist 2016). Apart from policies concerned with the 
reconciliation of work and family, (early childhood) education and ALMPs, such a life-course 
approach to human capital enhancement is also open to policies concerned with, amongst 
others, health and disability.  
In a comparable manner, Hemerijck (2017a) identifies three complementary functions 
of social investments over the life course: easing the ‘flow’ of labour market and life-course 
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 Note that Morel et al. (2012, p. 2 – emphasis added) provide a somewhat broader definition of social investment 
that covers policies “that both invest in human capital development (early childhood education and care, education 
and life-long training) and that help to make efficient use of human capital (through policies supporting women’s 
and lone parents ‘employment, trough active labour market policies, but also through specific forms of labour 
market regulation and social protection institutions that promote flexible security), while fostering greater social 
inclusion (notably by facilitating access to the labour market for groups that have traditionally been excluded)”. 
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transitions, raising the quality of the ‘stock’ of human capital, and operating as stabilisation 
‘buffer’ by offering a safety net. These functions can, in turn, be linked to a broad range of 
policies that go beyond ALMPs and education (De Deken 2017). More recent studies interested 
in the extent to which countries allocate resources to social investment have indeed focused on 
a broader set of policies concerned with different stages of the life course, also including 
policies such as maternity and parental leave and other family benefits (both cash and in-kind), 
home-help and care for the elderly, and services for the socially excluded and incapacitated 
(Kvist 2013; Kuitto 2016; Ronchi 2018). Guided by this literature we distinguish five groups 
of policies that are capable of mobilising the productive potential of citizens: ALMPs, care for 
the elderly and frail, early childhood policies, education, and maternity and parental leave. 
Moreover, these policies, to a large extent provided through services, can be expected to affect 
employment as well. 
 
2.2 Theorising social investment policies and employment  
In general, employment outcomes of social investment policies can be understood in a 
framework in which employment rates are determined by the demand for and the supply of 
labour. Demand and supply are driven by cyclical conditions and demographic factors 
respectively, whereas changes in demand and supply are mediated by labour market institutions 
and policies.  
A first type of social investment policy concerns active labour market policies 
(ALMPs). ALMPs are, on the one hand, aimed at maintaining labour market participation by 
preventing people from becoming inactive and protecting human capital. On the other hand, 
ALMPs are aimed at stimulating employment and participation by bringing unemployed and 
inactive people back into work (Bonoli 2010). The former is mainly attained through training 
and activation, whereas the latter is predominantly achieved through subsidised employment 
and public employment services. From a review of activating policies in OECD countries, 
Martin and Grubb (2001) concluded that job search assistance is particularly effective, but only 
when combined with increased monitoring and enforcement through public employment 
services. Start-up incentives often show positive effects, but apply to a small proportion of the 
unemployed only, whereas subsidised employment tends to involve substitution effects. In a 
more recent review of OECD studies Martin (2014) stresses the role of benefit conditionality. 
These observations are supported by the results of extensive meta-analyses by Kluve (2010) 
and Card et al. (2010; 2017). Public employment services such as job search assistance 
generally show positive impacts on employability and employment, whereas direct public 
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employment programmes tend to be less effective. Training programmes focused on human 
capital accumulation often have the strongest impact, although these positive effects might only 
manifest themselves throughout the first few years after completing the programme. While the 
different programmes grouped under ALMPs differ in terms of effectiveness and efficiency, 
these reviews suggest that they are capable of raising employment. Furthermore, international 
comparative studies find that ALMPs are positively related to employment rates (Bradley and 
Stephens 2007; Nelson and Stephens 2012). Hence, we hypothesise that ALMPs are positively 
associated with employment.   
 Another social investment policy is care for the elderly and frail (e.g. Greve 2018). It 
has been found that the provision of informal care to (disabled) elders keeps some people from 
working entirely, whereas others reconcile work and care by reducing working hours or 
rearranging work schedules (e.g. Stone and Short 1990). Such negative effects might, however, 
be relatively small (Ciani 2012) or hold for women only (Ettner 1996; Viitanen 2010). Still, the 
public provision of care for the elderly and frail can be expected to stimulate labour market 
participation amongst those people – women in particular – that would otherwise provide such 
informal care as it enables them to find a work-life balance (Taylor-Gooby 2004). At the same 
time, since formal care is provided as a service, it can be expected to increase the demand for 
labour in related jobs in the service sector (Ahn and Kim 2015). Therefore, we conjecture a 
positive association between care for the elderly and frail on employment. 
 Furthermore, subsidies on childcare may affect employment rates. Due to the costs 
associated with childcare, effective wages are affected when childcare is organised through 
market arrangements. In the absence of publicly funded childcare this leads parents – usually 
mothers – to leave the labour market in order to care for children (see for an overview: Anderson 
and Levine 2000). Through expenditures on childcare and early childhood education facilities, 
governments can stimulate labour market participation. The effectiveness of these policies, 
however, depends on their institutional design. If public childcare subsidies mainly operate by 
lowering the price of public childcare below the market clearing price so that public childcare 
is substituted for private childcare, they can be expected to have little to no effect on the 
aggregate use of childcare and hence employment (Gustafsson and Stafford 1992). Moreover, 
in some countries the availability of and access to both private and public childcare tends to be 
more important than its affordability in explaining labour market effects (Kreyenfeld and Hank 
2000; Chevalier and Viitanen 2002; Freeman and Schettkat 2005). As with care for the elderly 
and frail, another mechanism that could play a role is that expenditures on childcare can 
simultaneously fuel the demand for caregivers at crèches and kindergartens. Taken together, 
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we examine the hypothesis that expenditures on early childhood policies are positively 
associated with employment.  
 Another policy that has widely been discussed in the literature on social investment 
concerns education. Both initial education and education during working life can be expected 
to have a positive effect on the quality of a country’s labour force over the medium to long 
term. At the same time, a skilled and flexible labour force fosters competitiveness and thereby 
constitutes the key to productive and economic growth in a rapidly changing world (Lundvall 
and Lorenz 2012). This takes place in an increasingly globalised economy in which knowledge 
becomes obsolete more rapidly than before and where the need for manual labour power has 
been replaced by the need for skills relevant to the service-based knowledge economy. In such 
an economy there is therefore a greater need to invest in education in order to stimulate 
employment. Such spending can, on the one hand, be expected to increase attainment and 
thereby facilitate a skilled labour force and, on the other hand, improve the quality of instruction 
(Nelson and Stephens 2012). In short, expenditures on education essentially concern 
investments in human capital that increase the chances of finding a job and increase future 
productive capacity. We hence expect a positive association between education and 
employment. 
Last, childbirth may change the preferences of parents with regard to employment and 
labour market participation. In the absence of maternity and parental leave arrangements 
especially women are likely to (temporarily) quit employment. Yet, in the presence of such 
leave arrangements, people are ceteris paribus more likely to utilise this leave period and return 
to their pre-childbirth job once leave ends (Klerman and Leibowitz 1997). Although parental 
leave may thereby only delay the return to work or induce mothers that would otherwise find a 
new job to return to their old job, most empirical studies show that policies foreseeing in paid 
leave are associated with increases in female employment rates (Ruhm 1998; Akgunduz and 
Plantenga 2013), albeit often resulting in part-time employment (Rønsen and Sundström 2002; 
Gutiérez-Domènech 2005). Hence, the hypothesis to be tested is that family policies are 
positively associated with employment. Nevertheless, more recent studies have shown that long 
periods of paid leave may reduce returns to work, as a result of which the positive employment 
effects diminish or even become negative (Jaumotte 2003; Lalive and Zweimüller 2009; 
Akgunduz and Plantenga 2013). 
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2.3 Social investment and institutional complementarity  
An important insight from the social investment literature is that the outcomes of policies are 
shaped by their interdependence with other policies. In fact, when introducing the Social 
Investment Package, the European Commission (2013, p. 3) already acknowledged that the 
“investment dimension of a specific policy expenditure largely depends on its design features, 
[its] complementarity with other policies and circumstances in time”. Although the 
complementarity of social investment policies has received increasing attention in recent years 
(Bouget et al. 2015; Hemerijck et al. 2016; Dräbing and Nelson 2017), systematic empirical 
analyses are still scarce at this point.  
In the existing literature it has been acknowledged that outcomes of labour market 
institutions are contingent on cyclical factors (e.g. Abrassart 2015; Benda et al. 2018). In the 
field of labour economics, interactions between labour market institutions have also been 
studied thoroughly (e.g. Nickell et al. 2005; Bassanini and Duval 2009; Thévenon 2016). With 
respect to social investment specifically, most work centres around the theoretical 
complementarity of social investment policies over the life course (Hemerijck 2017a; Dräbing 
and Nelson 2017). Hemerijck et al. (2016) are the only ones who empirically test the 
complementarity of expenditures on two social investment policies, namely ALMPs and ECEC. 
They argue that their analysis “does suggest some important evidence of institutional 
complementarities […] where ALMP appears likely to be most effective in promoting 
employment particularly where polities also have introduced early-childhood assistance that 
ease the combination of work and family” (ibid, p. 48). We believe that such complementarities 
could apply to other policy combinations as well. For instance, care for the elderly and frail also 
facilitates the reconciliation of work and family life. In a similar vein, ALMPs could be 
expected to be more effective in countries that also foresee in care arrangements for (disabled) 
elders. Likewise, positive (negative) effects of parental and maternity leave might be reinforced 
(mitigated) when countries foresee in adequate levels of early childhood education and care, 
thereby easing the transition from temporary leave to work.  
 
2.4 Other factors that affect employment  
Apart from social investment policies, there are other factors that may affect employment rates, 
notably labour market institutions. First, employment protection legislation may be a relevant 
factor. Lay-off costs associated with employment protection legislation make adjustments of 
the workforce more costly and thereby mainly affect the dynamics rather than the level of 
employment. Furthermore, taxes on labour income can be expected to have a negative impact 
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on employment. Unemployment benefits constitute another relevant factor. Studies 
investigating the relation between the generosity of unemployment benefits and labour market 
outcomes suggest that benefit generosity mainly affects the duration of unemployment rather 
than employment levels in general. Nevertheless, high replacement rates can reduce the scar 
effects of unemployment by allowing for recovery, resulting in better, longer and more 
employment over the longer run. Last, industrial relations are of importance as well. Dependent 
on the bargaining power of trade unions as well as the centralisation of wage bargaining, 
different effects on employment levels could be expected (Bradley and Stephens 2007).  
In addition to institutional factors, socioeconomic conditions also play a role. The size 
of the dependent population is likely to influence the demand for care and education. When 
care is provided through informal arrangements, labour market participation can be expected to 
fall. In contrast, when care is provided through market arrangements, employment rates can be 
expected to increase. We distinguish between the dependent population below 15 (‘youth 
population’) and dependent population above 64 (‘aged population’) (cf. Huber et al. 2008). 
Furthermore, employment may be influenced by globalisation, because imports and exports 
affect the demand for labour (Samuelson 1971; Thewissen and Van Vliet 2019). Finally, 
employment levels depend on the state of the economy and are sensitive to shocks in the 
demand for labour (Nickell et al. 2005).  
 
2.5 Social investment and job quality  
Apart from stimulating employment, we believe that social investment could also be expected 
to affect the kind of employment realised. In the labour economics literature, for example, it 
has for quite some time been acknowledged that labour market institutions not only affect the 
number of jobs, but also the quality of employment (e.g. Acemoglu 2001). Intensified policy 
attention for the quality of employment has also sparked academic interest for this topic in 
recent years (e.g. Burchell et al. 2014), particularly given recent labour market reforms, 
increases in non-standard employment and the rise of precarious work throughout recent 
decades (e.g. Kalleberg 2009; Avdagic and Crouch 2015; Hipp et al. 2015). Despite this 
prominent role on the policy agenda (e.g. European Council 2000; OECD 2003; 2014a; 2018a; 
Acemoglu 2019), the quality of employment has hardly figured as subject of study in the 
scholarly literature on social investment.5 To the best of our knowledge, Nelson and Stephens 
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 Instead, several scholars have engaged with unintended consequences or negative side-effects associated with 
social investment’s focus on employment and employability. They argue that this focus might have come at the 
expense of policies concerned with poverty reduction and the mitigation of inequality and, additionally, claim that 
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(2012) are the only scholars who examine whether social investment is capable of producing 
high-quality jobs.  
This is somewhat surprising, given the potential of some of the social investment 
policies with regard to more qualitative aspects of employment. The provision of better training 
and assistance to the unemployed may, for example, result in better job matches. Likewise, 
policies concerned with care can be assumed to lead to better employment outcomes in terms 
of lower involuntary part-time employment rates and lower levels of job strain experienced due 
to inflexible working hours by enabling workers to reconcile work and family responsibilities. 
Childcare indeed constitutes one of the main factors studied in relation to part-time work (Hipp 
et al. 2015). 
Furthermore, due to structural changes and recent developments with regard to 
information and communications technology, “service sectors have taken over as the primary 
engines of output and employment expansion” (Wren 2013, p. 1). Wren et al. (2013) find that 
public investments in education can facilitate employment in ICT-intensive services, which 
have been typified as high-quality job (Nelson and Stephens 2012). Higher efforts on education 
might therefore lead to higher employment levels in knowledge-intensive sectors where 
physical health risk factors are likely to be lower than in other sectors and where workers might 
at the same time experience higher levels of autonomy and learning opportunities than in, for 
example, industrial sectors.  
 
3. Data, measures and method 
Following the availability of data on all relevant dependent and independent variables, the 
country sample comprises 26 OECD countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (USA). The time series 
start in 1990. Since data for some of the independent variables is not (yet) available for more 
recent years, it runs up to 2010. The panel is somewhat unbalanced, since the Central and 
                                                          
social investment might entail Matthew effects by being more beneficial to and accessible for the middle and upper 
classes rather than more disadvantaged groups (e.g. Cantillon 2011; Vandenbroucke and Vlemincx 2011; Van 
Kersbergen and Hemerijck 2012; Bonoli et al. 2017; see for empirical analyses of such claims: Van Vliet and 
Wang 2015; Noël 2018). 
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Eastern European countries are observed for shorter time spans and data on some of the 
independent variables is available for shorter time spans in some countries.6  
 
3.1 Dependent variables 
The dependent variable in the first part of this study is the employment rate, or employment to 
population ratio, expressed as the share of employed people as a percentage of the population 
(cf. Bradley and Stephens 2007):  
 employment rate𝑖,𝑗  =  total employed𝑖,𝑗population𝑖,𝑗  × 100                              (1) 
 
whereby 𝑖 refers to a specific age group in country 𝑗. Acknowledging the possibly disturbing 
effects of extended periods of schooling and early retirement on employment, this study focuses 
on the population of prime working age (25-54) (e.g. Kenworthy 2017; Kvist 2017). Besides, 
we believe that social investment is most likely to affect people within this age group and their 
employment decision rather than those still in education or just entering the labour market 
following education (15-24) or approaching retirement (55-64). We, however, also estimate 
regression models for the entire population of working age (15-64). 
 In the second party of our study we focus on qualitative aspects of the employment 
outcomes realised that have figured in literature on non-standard employment and the social 
investment literature. Specifically, we use the following proxies of job quality: the share of 
employees working full-time as a percentage of all employees, the share of employees working 
part-time involuntarily as a percentage of all employees working part-time, the share of 
employees with a permanent contract as a percentage of all employees with either a permanent 
or temporary contract (e.g. Kalleberg 2000; Hipp et al. 2015), and the share of employees 
working in knowledge-intensive sectors as a percentage of all employees (Nelson and Stephens 
2012). Again we focus on the population of prime working age, although data on employment 
by sector does not distinguish between ages and is therefore only available for all people in 
employment.  
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 Data on all the variables is available since 1990 for the following countries: DNK, FIN, FRA, IRL, NLD, NOR, 
ESP, SWE, GBR, and USA. For other countries data for all the variables is available since later years: 1991 for 
JPN; 1992 for BEL and PRT; 1995 for CAN; 1996 for DEU; 1998 for AUS, AUT, CZE and POL; 1999 for NZL 
and CHE; 2000 for HUN and the SVK; 2005 for ITA; and 2006 for EST and SVN. Note that the panel is 
characterised by gaps in 1992, 1993, 1995 and 1996 in most of the countries due to a lack of data on expenditures 
on education by education level, as a result of which effort on education cannot be calculated.  
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3.2 Independent variables 
Our independent variables of interest concern effort on the five social investment policies. The 
operationalisation of the variables strongly follows Vandenbroucke and Vleminckx (2011).7 
We measure social investment effort using a disaggregated spending approach, whereby 
expenditures on a specific programme are corrected for the number of beneficiaries as 
expenditures are partly driven by need. Next, these measures are related to GDP per capita, in 
order to allow for comparison across countries and over time.8 To obtain expenditures on a 
programme we use the sum of public and mandatory private expenditures available from the 
OECD’s Social Expenditure (SOCX), Labour Market Programmes, and Education and Training 
databases. Since there is no data available on the number of beneficiaries of the different 
policies for the years considered here, we rely on proxies.9 The precise expenditure categories 
and beneficiary groups used are listed in Table 1.  
 
Table 1 Operationalisation of effort on different social investment policies 
Active labour 
market policies 
Care for elderly 
and frail 
Early childhood 
policies 
Education Maternity and 
parental leave 
 
PES and 
administration; 
Training; 
Employment 
incentives; 
Start-up incentives 
 
 
 
LMP: 6-10  
 6-20 
 6-40 
 6-70 
 
Residential care / 
home-help services; 
Other benefits in 
kind; 
Residential care / 
home-help services; 
Other benefits in 
kind 
 
SOCX: 1-2-1   
 1-2-2    
 3-2-1    
 3-2-3 
 
 
Early childhood 
education and care; 
Home help / 
accommodation; 
Other benefits in 
kind 
 
 
 
SOCX:  5-2-1   
 5-2-2  
 5-2-3 
 
Total expenditures 
on educational 
institutions 
(primary-tertiary) 
 
Maternity and 
parental leave 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOCX:  5-1-2 
Unemployed Population aged ≥65 Children aged 0-5 Students enrolled Children aged 0 
GDP per capita 
  
In operationalising effort on ALMPs we focus on programmes that clearly reflect social 
investment aspects such as activation and human capital development. Following Bonoli (2012) 
we only consider programmes associated with his categories ‘upskilling’ and ‘employment 
assistance’ (Bonoli 2010). We correct these for the number of unemployed. Better data on the 
                                                          
7
 Note that Ronchi (2016) also adopted a highly similar approach in his Social Investment Welfare Expenditure 
data set using data from Eurostat (ESSPROS). 
8
 See Scarpetta (1996) and Van Vliet and Koster (2011).   
9
 In its Social Benefit Recipients Database (SOCR), the OECD provides recipient stocks by social protection 
branch (old-age, disability, unemployment and poverty) and at progamme level. In some countries, stocks on 
relevant programmes are, however, missing. Moreover, the data is available since 2007 only and does not cover 
all the policies and programmes studied here. 
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number of beneficiaries has been available for a short while (cf. Clasen et al. 2016). The OECD 
Labour Market Programmes database provides data on participant stocks in all active labour 
market programmes, except for public employment services as this is not characterised by 
individual participation but serves participants in all programmes. For most European countries, 
these data are available since 1998 only. For non-European countries, data is either not available 
or for more recent years only. In addition, there are quite a lot of missing values for some of the 
programmes.  
Under care for the elderly and frail we group all in-kind old age and incapacity-related 
benefits, except for expenditures on rehabilitation services. Since we do not have data on the 
number of incapacitated individuals due to disability, occupational injury and disease or 
sickness, we correct these expenditures for the number of people aged 65 and above, only. Note 
that this probably overestimates effort by countries on this social investment policy, because 
the beneficiary group we define here only partly covers the entire beneficiary group. The 
denominator of effort on care for the elderly and frail (the beneficiary group, which covers all 
people of old age but does not include people receiving incapacity-related benefits) is smaller 
than it should be given the programmes included in the numerator (expenditures on old age and 
incapacity-related services). Nevertheless, there seems to be no reason to believe that this 
involves any bias, because we assume that there are no structural differences in the number of 
incapacitated individuals across countries and over time.  
We rely on a rather inclusive definition of early childhood policies, that not only 
includes ECEC, but also other in-kind services targeted at parents of young children such as 
home-help. Note that it excludes passive transfers such as child allowances. Since expenditures 
on ECEC in the SOCX database have already been adjusted for cross-national differences in 
the compulsory age of entry into primary school so that they refer to children aged 0-5 only 
(Adema et al. 2011, p. 92)10, overall effort on early childhood policies has also been corrected 
to refer to children aged 0-5 specifically. 
Expenditures on education cover expenditures on primary, secondary and tertiary 
education. As far as we know, no adequate time-series cross-country data for expenditures on 
education during working life is available. Data on enrolment by education level from the same 
OECD Education and Training Database are used to obtain effort per student. Maternity and 
                                                          
10
 For several countries expenditures on ECEC before 1998 exclude expenditures on pre-primary education. These 
expenditures were therefore included. In order to grant comparability over time, these expenditures were also 
adjusted so that they refer to children aged 0-5 by excluding expenditures on pre-primary education for 6-years 
olds in some (Nordic) countries and including expenditures on primary education for 4-year olds in some (Anglo-
Saxon) countries. 
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parental leave comprises expenditures on these leave arrangements. Since entitlement is 
connected to childbirth, we correct these expenditures for the number of new-born children: the 
number of children aged 0. Indirectly this also captures institutional aspect such as the number 
of (paid) weeks of maternity and parental leave (e.g. Gauthier 2011), as countries with more 
generous leave arrangements also score higher on our indicator of effort on maternity and 
parental leave.11 
It should be noted that social expenditure indicators have some limitations. First, 
expenditure-based measures may not capture institutional characteristics of welfare 
programmes (Siegel 2007; De Deken 2014). Moreover, some countries are characterised by 
internal heterogeneity in terms of social programmes, for example due to territorial differences. 
According to Ciccia and Javornik (2019, p. 2) focusing on the national level “is particularly 
problematic for the study of social investment-type policies such as childcare, education and 
labour market policies for which decentralised implementation, financing and delivery are the 
norm”. This caveat notwithstanding, there is relatively little variation in the characteristics 
determining eligibility for and access to social investment policies like eldercare, childcare, and 
education. Benefits received through these policies do usually not depend on past earning and 
payments. Besides, education programmes are likely to experience small cross-country 
variation in terms of entitlement due to universal access to primary and lower secondary 
schools. For such welfare programmes, social expenditures do constitute an adequate measure 
(Jensen 2011). Nevertheless Adema et al. (2011, p. 92) acknowledge that recording public 
support for childcare is often difficult in countries (other than the Nordic ones) where local 
governments play a role in financing childcare services. Furthermore, variation in expenditures 
across or within countries may not only reflect policy preferences, but may also be the result of 
different demographic compositions and economic trends (Van Vliet 2010; Jensen 2011). Note 
that our operationalisations of effort on social investment policies address these demographic 
and economic aspects. Despite these limitations, an important advantage of using disaggregated 
expenditure measures constitutes the fact that it provides a bird-eye overview, which enables 
one to identify the diverse spending priorities both across and within countries (Castles 2009).  
For the strictness of employment protection legislation (EPL) we use the OECD 
indicators (version 1) and similar indicators compiled by Avdagic (2012) for some of the 
                                                          
11
 Effort on maternity parental leave and the generosity of maternity and parental leave (operationalised as the sum 
of the number of weeks of maternity and parental leave, both weighted by level of cash benefits received during 
this period of leave as a percentage of the female average production worker wage available from Gauthier 2011) 
are quite strongly correlated: r = 0.69, p < 0.01. Note that these data are, however, not available for the six Central 
and Eastern European countries. 
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Central and Eastern European countries not covered by the OECD. Overall EPL is calculated 
as the unweighted average of EPL for regular and temporary contracts. Data on the tax wedge 
and the net replacement rate of unemployment benefits for the average production worker is 
retrieved from Van Vliet and Caminada (2012). Information about industrial relations comes 
from Visser (2016). For the computation of the relative shares of the dependent population we 
rely on UN population figures. Globalisation is measured through capital and trade openness: 
the sum of inward and outward FDI flows and imports and exports respectively as a share of 
GDP using OECD data. We include real GDP per capita as an additional control for the state 
of the economy. Last, we control for shocks in the demand for labour following Nickell et al. 
(2005, p. 10; cf. Been and Van Vliet 2017), who operationalise this as the residuals obtained 
when regressing employment on its own lags and lags of real GDP and real labour costs per 
employee. The operationalisation of all variables, the sources used, and descriptive statistics 
are presented in Table A1.  
 
3.3 Method 
To examine the relationship between effort on social investment policies and employment 
outcomes pooled time-series cross-section regression analyses are conducted. We estimate the 
following equation: 
 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑥𝑗,𝑖,𝑡−1𝑗 +  ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑤𝑘,𝑖,𝑡−1𝑘 +  ∑ 𝛿𝑚𝑧𝑚,𝑖,𝑡−1𝑚 +  𝜐𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    (2) 
    
where 𝑥𝑗,𝑖𝑡−1 are j main independent variables, the social investment policies, 𝑤𝑘,𝑖𝑡−1 represent 
k institutional control variables, 𝑧𝑚,𝑖𝑡−1 are m socioeconomic control variables, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the 
error term. Based on the results of several diagnostic tests, outlined in Appendix 1, we include 
both country and year fixed effects, modelled through υi and λt respectively. When examining 
complementarity the equation is augmented with a multiplicative interaction term. In order to 
address spatial correlation of the errors, panel heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation we use 
panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) and Prais-Winsten transformation (Beck and Katz 
1995).  
We use one year lags for our independent variables. While some social investment 
policies can be expected to have rather direct, short-term impacts, others only reveal their 
impact over the medium or long term. Yet, this might be more applicable to distributive and 
inequality effects than employment effects (Verbist 2017). Policies for which longer timer 
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horizons are particularly relevant concern education (early childhood as well as primary to 
tertiary) and, to a somewhat lesser extent, some active labour market programmes. In the short 
term, education might even have a negative impact on the supply of labour as people participate 
in education instead of the labour market (Verbist 2017). Despite the fact that the life-course 
perspective figures centrally in the social investment literature, it should be noted that 
measuring long-term returns is analytically difficult and possibly even impossible or 
undesirable (Hemerijck et al. 2016). Our analysis technique, using one year lags for the 
independent variables, limits us to the estimation of short-term effects. While we acknowledge 
that using a longer time horizon is desirable for some of the social investment policies we 
would, however, not know of a more appropriate method capable of doing that with the data at 
hand.  
 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive results 
Figure A1 shows that there is variation in employment rates across countries and over time. 
Employment is particularly high (nearly 85%) in the Nordic countries as well as in Switzerland 
and the Czech Republic. In Southern European countries like Italy and Spain as well as in 
Ireland employment levels have been considerably lower (around 60-70%). Over time 
employment rates have risen in practically all countries, albeit to different degrees. In several 
countries this is predominantly the result of increases in female labour market participation. 
The Netherlands and Ireland stand out because of the large increases they experienced in both 
overall and female employment. Male employment rates show a more volatile development 
over time, characterised by both increases and decreases. Nevertheless, male employment 
exhibits substantially less variation as rates are on average 85-90% in all countries except for 
some of the Central and Eastern European. The Czech Republic and Estonia are the only 
countries that show decreases in overall employment, which is to a large extent due to the fact 
that their labour markets were affected by their postsocialist transition. Following the economic 
crisis, decreases can be observed in nearly all countries after 2008. Again, there is a lot of 
variation in the magnitude of these changes.  
Figure A2 shows that there is variation in social investment expenditures across 
countries and over time as well, whereby the Nordic countries stand out as the most generous 
spenders when it comes to overall spending on social investment. However, patterns in other 
country groups tend to be less clear. Table 2 hence presents effort on the five social investment 
policies separately. As will be elaborated below, this shows that different types of welfare states  
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Table 2  Effort on social investment policies (per recipient as a share of GDP per capita), 1990-2010 
 
Active labour market 
policies per unemployed 
 
Care for the elderly and frail 
per person aged ≥65  
Early childhood policies per 
child aged 0-5 
 
Primary, secondary and 
tertiary education per student 
enrolled 
 
Maternity and parental leave 
per child aged 0 
 
1990 2000 2010 
Change 
1990-
2010   1990 2000 2010 
Change 
1990-
2010   1990 2000 2010 
Change 
1990-
2010   1990 2000 2010 
Change 
1990-
2010   1990 2000 2010 
Change 
1990-
2010 
 
Australia 5.2 7.2 8.4 3.1  5.3 13.6 8.4 3.0  5.8 7.3 9.9 4.1  — 17.3 21.9 4.6  0.0 2.4 9.4 9.4 
Austria 17.9 26.5 30.6 12.7  2.4 4.2 5.4 3.0  4.8 6.5 11.3 6.5  26.8 27.3 28.3 1.5  38.4 38.7 16.6 –21.8 
Belgium 14.4 17.4 13.8 –0.6  0.2 2.3 3.5 3.4  7.8 10.6 15.0 7.3  24.2 21.7 25.4 1.2  13.1 16.6 18.9 5.8 
Canada 11.1 8.9 6.4 –4.6  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.8 2.0 3.4 2.6  27.3 25.1 30.4 3.2  7.8 10.7 24.9 17.1 
Czech Republic 5.9 3.2 5.5 –0.4  3.3 4.3 2.0 –1.4  — 8.3 8.1 –0.1  22.8 18.0 22.2 –0.6  30.4 67.9 81.7 51.4 
Denmark 16.7 56.4 35.1 18.4  17.5 17.1 20.6 3.1  24.6 25.3 31.2 6.6  29.7 29.4 30.6 0.9  36.1 41.9 47.0 10.9 
Estonia — 1.5 2.6 1.1  — 2.7 2.2 –0.5  — 3.9 6.1 2.2  — 21.5 29.0 7.5  — 51.2 127.5 76.3 
Finland 28.0 13.8 19.5 –8.5  8.3 8.1 11.0 2.8  17.6 17.7 23.2 5.6  30.9 22.3 25.1 –5.8  83.0 62.0 62.4 –20.6 
France 14.9 15.6 20.7 5.8  3.9 2.2 2.8 –1.1  19.0 20.2 16.9 –2.1  24.3 25.3 27.6 3.3  23.4 29.7 23.9 0.6 
Germany 31.0 23.2 22.3 –8.7  1.3 2.9 2.6 1.3  10.5 12.5 18.4 8.0  25.6 23.9 25.7 0.1  24.8 26.5 34.8 10.0 
Hungary 11.5 9.4 5.3 –6.2  — 5.0 4.5 –0.5  — 18.9 20.3 1.4  28.9 21.7 19.8 –9.1  — 53.4 79.7 26.3 
Ireland 16.9 23.2 9.8 –7.0  3.7 2.0 5.3 1.6  3.4 4.8 9.4 6.0  16.9 16.6 24.8 7.9  5.2 3.5 11.9 6.7 
Italy — 17.7 11.8 –5.9  0.7 0.8 1.0 0.2  9.4 10.1 11.7 2.3  25.2 24.6 25.5 0.4  9.6 13.1 20.3 10.7 
Japan 29.0 10.4 8.0 –21.0  1.6 4.9 7.9 6.3  12.9 17.2 23.0 10.1  20.2 24.0 30.0 9.8  6.8 10.8 20.7 13.9 
Netherlands 16.0 36.6 21.8 5.8  3.9 4.6 6.0 2.0  10.7 9.5 12.6 1.9  25.0 22.4 26.2 1.2  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
New Zealand 18.4 13.7 7.2 –11.2  0.9 0.0 0.3 –0.5  — 6.9 12.7 5.8  — 20.9 23.8 2.9  0.0 0.0 4.9 4.9 
Norway 22.5 28.3 23.3 0.8  13.3 15.5 14.9 1.7  10.8 14.5 23.3 12.4  25.8 21.7 23.2 –2.6  26.3 59.7 47.7 21.3 
Poland 4.0 2.1 10.2 6.2  2.1 0.3 1.6 –0.5  — 2.8 9.0 6.2  — 19.5 25.2 5.7  20.5 30.8 29.2 8.7 
Portugal 17.0 26.6 11.1 –5.9  0.2 0.3 0.6 0.4  2.4 6.2 8.2 5.7  19.8 23.7 25.5 5.7  6.6 10.7 30.9 24.3 
Slovak Republic 7.2 1.8 3.8 –3.4  5.0 5.4 5.2 0.2  — 7.7 7.4 –0.4  — 17.6 20.8 3.2  45.6 63.7 54.9 9.3 
Slovenia — 3.8 10.1 6.3  — 1.8 1.8 0.1  — 11.1 8.8 –2.2  — 26.2 27.4 1.2  — 60.7 67.8 7.1 
Spain 9.9 10.2 7.4 –2.5  1.3 1.6 4.9 3.6  6.3 11.7 13.2 6.9  20.8 22.1 26.7 5.9  6.1 13.4 32.2 26.0 
Sweden 110.1 45.7 19.6 –90.5  8.1 20.7 22.1 14.0  28.8 21.3 28.3 –0.5  28.8 23.8 24.7 –4.1  73.3 64.2 60.0 –13.3 
Switzerland 7.8 21.8 15.1 7.4  3.2 4.3 4.7 1.5  3.2 3.7 5.5 2.4  28.2 27.3 28.7 0.5  6.5 7.5 11.1 4.6 
United Kingdom 10.8 7.4 8.8 –1.9  3.2 4.0 5.9 2.8  8.9 10.8 19.2 10.2  19.7 16.1 26.6 7.0  6.7 6.2 12.3 5.6 
United States 5.9 5.2 1.9 –4.0  0.3 0.3 0.2 –0.1  5.2 7.8 8.2 3.0  21.3 28.0 29.0 7.7  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
19 
 
                        
Liberal 11.4 10.9 7.1 –4.3  2.2 3.3 3.4 1.1  4.8 6.6 10.5 5.6  21.3 20.7 26.1 4.8  3.3 3.8 10.6 7.3 
Conservative 18.7 21.7 18.9 0.2  2.4 3.6 4.7 2.4  9.8 11.5 14.7 4.8  24.9 24.6 27.4 2.5  16.1 18.5 18.0 1.9 
Nordic 44.3 36.0 24.4 –19.9  11.8 15.3 17.2 5.4  20.5 19.7 26.5 6.0  28.8 24.3 25.9 –2.9  54.7 57.0 54.3 –0.4 
Mediterranean 13.4 18.2 10.1 –3.3  0.7 0.9 2.2 1.4  6.0 9.3 11.0 5.0  21.9 23.5 25.9 4.0  7.4 12.4 27.8 20.3 
Central and Eastern 
European 
7.1 3.6 6.2 –0.9  3.5 3.2 2.9 –0.6  — 8.8 10.0 1.2  25.8 20.7 24.1 –1.8  32.2 54.6 73.5 41.3 
                        
Overall mean 18.8 16.8 13.1 –5.7  3.9 5.0 5.6 1.7  10.2 10.7 14.0 3.9  24.6 22.6 25.9 1.3  20.4 28.7 35.8 15.4 
Standard deviation 21.3 13.8 8.6 –12.7  4.3 5.6 5.8 1.5  7.6 6.2 7.3 –0.2  3.9 3.6 2.9 –1.0  22.6 24.4 30.2 7.6 
Coefficient of 
variation 
1.1 0.8 0.7 –0.5  1.1 1.1 1.0 –0.1  0.7 0.6 0.5 –0.2  0.2 0.2 0.1 –0.1  1.1 0.9 0.8 –0.3 
                        
  
  
Notes: For some countries data are around 1990 or 2000: 
 
AUS and SVK 1990 refer to 
1994; CZE 1990 refers to 
1993; EST and SVN 2000 
refer to 2003; HUN and POL 
1990 refer to 1992; ITA 2000 
refers to 2004; CHE 1990 
refers to 1991;  
 
CZE 1990 refers to 1995; EST 
and HUN 2000 refer to 1999; 
SVK 1990 refers to 1995; 
SVN 2000 refers to 1996; 
 
AUS, BEL, CHE 1990 refer to 
1991; CZE and POL 2000 
refer to 1997; EST, HUN and 
SVK 2000 refer to 1999; DEU 
1990 refers to 1993; NZL 2000 
refers to 1998; SVN 2000 
refers to 1996  
 
EST and HUN 2000 refer to 
1999; SVK 2000 refers to 
1995; SVN 2000 refers to 
1996 
 
AUS, NZL and POL 2000 refer 
to 1997; CAN and CZE 1990 
refer to 1994; EST and SVN 
2000 refer to 2005; DEU 1990 
refers to 1995; HUN, PRT and 
CHE 1990 refer to 1991; SVK 
2000 refers to 1999. 
Source: OECD Labour Market Programmes Database, OECD Social Expenditure Database, OECD Education and Training Database and own calculations. 
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prioritise different kinds of social investment policies. Across countries efforts on four of the 
five social investment policies have converged towards a higher level over time, which is 
indicated by decreases in the coefficients of variation while overall means have increased. 
Remarkably, social investment oriented ALMPs are the only policies for which effort in terms 
of expenditures per recipient has decreased. Nevertheless, the data exhibits great variation in 
terms of the level of effort and changes thereof. The Nordic countries are the most generous 
when it comes to effort on ALMPs, both historically and in more recent years. Some 
conservative welfare states such as Austria, France, Germany and the Netherlands attain similar 
levels of effort, whilst efforts in liberal and Central Eastern European are relatively low. 
With regard to effort on policies related to care, the Nordic countries again stand out as 
most generous in terms of effort per recipient. When it comes to care for the old and young 
population, efforts by liberal, Mediterranean and Central Eastern European countries are quite 
similar. Efforts by conservative welfare states are somewhat more generous, but nowhere near 
those found in Nordic welfare states. Note, however, that there is a lot of variation within these 
groups of welfare states. With respect to maternity and parental leave, the data show that Central 
and Eastern European countries have overtaken the Nordic countries in terms of resources 
allocated to every recipient. In recent years, liberal and Mediterranean welfare states have also 
increased their efforts on this policy, but they still rank amongst countries with relatively low 
efforts, which also includes most of the conservative welfare states. Efforts on education exhibit 
the least variation across countries, as indicated by the relatively low standard deviations and 
coefficients of variation, which have even decreased over time. This convergence is to a large 
extent the result of catch-up amongst some of the countries that were traditionally characterised 
by lower efforts on education. 
 
4.2 Regression results 
The variation in both employment rates and efforts on social investment policies is further 
examined using regression analyses. The results are presented in Table 3, in which we build up 
our preferred model step by step. We start by including our control variables and country and 
year fixed effects only. As expected, the results indicate that taxes on labour are negatively 
associated with employment rates. This corresponds with the idea that taxes discourage 
employment. Real GDP per capita, shocks in labour demand and trade openness are all 
positively correlated with employment. We also obtain a positive estimate for the dependent 
population above 64, which seems a bit surprising. In contrast to what one might expect, our 
results indicate that ageing populations are associated with higher employment amongst the  
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Table 3 Regressions of employment and effort on social investment policies, 1990-2010 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Effort on social investment policies          
Active labour market policiest-1 
 
  0.11*** 
    
  0.13***   0.13***   0.14*** 
 
 (0.01) 
    
 (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Care for the elderly and frailt-1 
  –0.20***      0.17**   0.18***   0.11* 
  
 (0.04) 
   
 (0.07)  (0.05)  (0.07) 
Early childhood policiest-1 
   
  0.01 
  –0.04 –0.08** –0.07 
    
 (0.04) 
  
 (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.05) 
Educationt-1 
    –0.08*  –0.05 –0.11 –0.14** 
     
 (0.04) 
 
 (0.05)  (0.08)  (0.06) 
Maternity and parental leavet-1 
     –0.02* –0.03**   0.01 –0.04*** 
     
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Labour market institutions          
Employment protection legislationt-1   0.46 –0.18   0.25   0.47   0.51   0.44 –0.05 –0.40* –0.15 
 (0.34)  (0.36)  (0.35)  (0.31)  (0.32)  (0.34)  (0.44)  (0.24)  (0.46) 
Tax wedget-1 –0.12*** –0.11*** –0.13*** –0.10*** –0.10** –0.13*** –0.12***   0.01 –0.13*** 
 
 (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Unemployment benefitst-1 –0.01 –0.02 –0.02   0.01   0.02 –0.01 –0.00   0.01   0.01 
 
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03) 
Trade union densityt-1   0.04   0.04   0.04   0.05   0.08**   0.04   0.07**   0.03*   0.09* 
 
 (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.05) 
Coordination of wage bargainingt-1   0.16   0.14   0.16   0.16   0.18   0.16   0.20 –0.51**   0.32* 
 (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.14)  (0.11)  (0.14)  (0.24)  (0.17) 
Socioeconomic factors          
Dependent population <15t-1 –0.13 –0.19 –0.09 –0.55*** –0.58*** –0.15 –0.71*** –0.34*** –0.78*** 
 (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.17)  (0.16)  (0.19)  (0.16)  (0.14)  (0.12)  (0.16) 
Dependent population ≥65t-1   0.87***   0.75***   0.84***   0.68***   0.61**   0.87***   0.54***   0.10   0.12 
 (0.20)  (0.18)  (0.20)  (0.22)  (0.26)  (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.15)  (0.14) 
Capital opennesst-1   0.01   0.00   0.00    0.00    0.00   0.01 –0.00   0.00    0.00 
 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Trade openesst-1    0.02***   0.02***    0.02***   0.02**   0.02***   0.02**   0.02**   0.01   0.02 
 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Real GDP per capitat-1   0.39***   0.34***   0.36***    0.36***   0.33***    0.38***   0.28***   0.22***   0.14*** 
 
 (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.05) 
Shocks in labour demand 38.61*** 39.53***  37.82*** 34.13*** 35.74*** 36.84*** 34.87*** 40.54** 50.19*** 
 
 (6.49)  (6.75)  (6.60)  (7.68)  (10.10)  (6.58) (10.36)  (18.31)   (14.31) 
          
Constant 62.63*** 65.79*** 64.91*** 73.61*** 74.86*** 63.29*** 78.53*** 76.77*** 87.59*** 
 
 (5.73)  (5.81)  (5.83)  (5.76)  (7.23)  (5.61)  (6.06)  (4.13)  (5.58) 
          
Number of observations 483 463 479 410 357 479 339 339 339 
Adjusted R-squared 0.981 0.984 0.981 0.987 0.990 0.981 0.991 0.982 0.990 
Rho 0.685 0.684 0.679 0.668 0.683 0.685 0.622 0.855 0.634 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Notes: 
 
Model 7 concerns what we refer to as our ‘preferred model’; panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses;  
* p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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population of prime working age. This suggests that prime age workers do not quit work in 
order to care for the elderly and frail. A potential explanation for this result could be that 
countries that experience ageing populations implement policies aimed at raising the carrying 
capacity of the welfare state (such as social investment policies, not modelled here yet) or that 
ageing populations positively affect demand for labour in certain service sectors (such as care), 
thereby resulting in higher employment.  
In models 2-6 we augment the previous model with effort on one single social 
investment policy at a time. This leaves most of the control variables unaffected. Only when 
including effort on education, the positive estimate for union density becomes statistically 
significant (model 5), whilst the negative estimate for the dependent population below 15 
becomes statistically significant when including effort on policies concerned with education 
(models 4 and 5). Model 7 concerns our preferred model in which we include all five social 
investment policies at the same time. This shows that the estimates obtained for efforts on care 
for the elderly and frail and education are contingent on the inclusion of other social investment 
policies. When including the other social investment policies, the negative coefficient for effort 
on education is no longer statistically significant. Likewise, the negative estimate obtained for 
effort on care for the elderly and frail in model 2 becomes positive when controlling for the 
other social investment policies.12 A supplementary analysis (Table A2) in which we exclude 
one social investment policy at a time shows that we only find a negative estimate for effort on 
care for the elderly and frail when effort on social investment oriented ALMPs are excluded (r 
= 0.51, p < 0.01). The negative estimate for effort on education is only found when excluding 
effort on maternity and parental leave (r = 0.12, p < 0.05). 
As hypothesised, our preferred model based on a within-country design indicates that 
effort on social investment oriented ALMPs is positively associated with employment. More 
specifically, a one percentage point increase in expenditures on ALMPs per unemployed as a 
share of GDP per capita is associated with a 0.13 percentage point increase in the employment 
rate. To illustrate, the more generous effort on ALMPs per unemployed in 2009 (approximately 
€6,880) compared to 2008 (approximately €6,330) in Germany, amounting to an increase of 
approximately €550 per unemployed (an increase of approximately 2.6 percentage points), is 
                                                          
12
 Additional analysis show that the different signs are not the result of using a different sample due to a loss of 
observations when including more variables in the model. When estimating model 3 with the same 339 
observations as those used for our preferred model (7) we also obtain a negative estimate. 
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predicted to increase employment by (2.577 × 0.135 =) 0.348 percentage points, which is the 
equivalent of an additional 121,000 people aged 25-54 being employed.13 
The positive association found for effort on care for the elderly and frail is in line with 
studies describing the manner in which the in-kind public provision of care and benefits that 
increase access to the private provision of care for frail and older people create formal care 
markets that facilitate labour market participation of people that would otherwise provide 
informal care (Taylor-Gooby 2004; Simonazzi 2009). Effort on care for elderly and frail 
relatives indeed seems to enable people that would otherwise provide such (informal) care to 
find a better work-life balance and thereby participate on the labour market. For effort on early 
childhood policies we find no significant correlation. This result suggests that at the macro level 
early childhood policies do not succeed in stimulating employment rates. However, the result 
could potentially also be explained by rather recent findings in the literature, which show that 
(female) labour supply elasticities have decreased due to increasing participation (e.g. Blau and 
Kahn 2007; Heim 2007; Bargain et al. 2014). According to Fitzpatrick (2010) not finding a 
statistically significant effect (unlike older studies that did find positive effects) might be due 
to the fact that the population of working women has changed. For effort on education we find 
no significant coefficient. This is probably due to the short time horizon being studied here, 
which is inherent to our analysis technique. Furthermore, maternity and parental leave are found 
to be negatively associated with employment. Although this result is not in line with the main 
theoretical argument, it seems to align with the observation that more generous and particularly 
long leave policies decrease labour market attachment and hence induce labour market exits 
(Jaumotte 2003; Lalive and Zweimüller 2009).14  
When using a simple pooled regression by leaving out the country and year fixed effects 
we obtain model 8. It shows that countries with high efforts on social investment oriented 
ALMPs and care for the elderly and frail tend to have higher employment rates amongst the 
population of prime working age. In contrast, high efforts on early childhood policies are 
associated with lower employment levels. This is somewhat surprising, because Nordic 
                                                          
13
 In 2009 the employment rate in Germany was (28,094,000 ÷ 34,771,000) × 100% = 80.80%. The predicted 
increase of 0.348% would result in an employment rate of 80.80 + 0.348 = 81.14%. Given the overall population 
of prime working age, this would involve (34,771,000 × 0.8114 =) 28,215,000 people being employed, which is 
an increase of (28,215,000 – 28,094,000 ≈) 121,100 people. 
14
 At the same time, labour supply elasticities are likely to be relatively low in these countries given the high 
employment rates. Still, one would expect to find little or no effect in that case rather than a negative coefficient 
(cf. Fitzpatrick 2010). The negative association might also be a data issue, because respondents to the labour force 
who were on maternity or parental leave might have indicated that they did not work during the reference period, 
despite being formally employed, and thereby incorrectly be classified as not employed. 
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countries are well known for high employment levels – particularly amongst women – which 
are often attributed to the generosity of ECEC in these countries.15  
Turning to labour market institutions, we find that countries with stricter EPL tend to 
have lower employment rates due to lower labour market flexibility. While stronger unions are 
generally associated with higher wage demands and, consequently, lower employment levels, 
our results suggest that higher union density stimulates employment. Although this challenges 
insights from right-to-manage models of wage bargaining, which resemble centralised 
bargaining, it corresponds with insights from efficient contracts models, which resemble more 
decentralised levels of bargaining (e.g. Oswald 1985). On average, bargaining takes place at 
rather decentralised levels.16 The negative coefficient for the centralisation of wage bargaining 
further supports this explanation. In addition, the pooled regression model suggests that the size 
of the aged population and level of trade openness do not matter with regard to employment, 
whereas the fixed effects model suggested that changes in the values of these variables within 
countries do affect employment.  
Model 9 concerns a within country analysis that does not control for year specific 
employment effects by leaving out time fixed effects (which, for example, capture economic 
conditions not captured by any of the other variables in the model). In comparison to our 
preferred model we obtain similar results for all the social investment policies except for effort 
on education. In contrast to our preferred model with both country and year fixed effects and 
the simple pooled regression model we now find a statistically significant, negative association. 
Besides, the estimates for the dependent population and trade openness are no longer 
statistically significant, whereas we do obtain a significant coefficient for the centralisation of 
wage bargaining.  
 
4.3 Robustness checks and additional analyses 
We have conducted a wide range of additional analyses to examine the robustness of our results. 
As indicated by the result in Appendix 2, our estimates for the five social investment policies 
are robust to slightly different operationalisations of effort on these policies. The signs are 
always in the same direction, except when replacing effort on education by educational 
attainment (cf. Nelson and Stephens 2012) and effort on maternity and parental leave by the 
                                                          
15
 However, the coefficient fails to reach statistical significance when either effort on ALMPs (r = 0.50; p < 
0.01) or effort on care for the elderly and frail (r = 0.74; p < 0.01) is not included. In that case we do obtain a 
negative, statistically significant coefficient for effort on education (r = 0.31; p < 0.01). 
16
 The average value of the centralisation of wage bargaining is 2.8. A value of 2 corresponds with mixed industry 
and firm-level bargaining, whereas a value of 3 indicates industry bargaining with no or irregular pattern setting. 
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institutional generosity of leave arrangements. When using on these alternative measures we 
obtain estimates that are in line with the theoretical expectations outlined instead. The positive, 
statistically significant estimate for effort on social investment oriented ALMPs is always 
replicated. In addition, only in a model with substantially lower numbers of observations we 
fail to find a statistically significant estimate for effort on care for the elderly and frail. Estimates 
for effort on early childhood policies are never statistically significant, whereas the negative 
estimates for effort on education are neither statistically significant in nearly all models. Finally, 
the statistically significant, negative estimate for effort on maternity and parental leave is also 
replicated in all models, except when using the institutional generosity of leave arrangements. 
In that case we obtain a positive estimate.  
 We also estimated our preferred model again including additional variables to test for 
omitted variable bias (Appendix 3). All our results are replicated. Only when including both 
educational attainment and effort on education the negative estimate for the latter becomes 
statistically significant, but we obtain a statistically significant positive estimate for the former. 
Additionally, the use of slightly more conservative standard errors robust to cross-sectional 
dependence (Driscoll-Kraay standard errors) and the use of a different estimation technique 
capable of capturing both short-term transitory effects and long-term structural effects (error-
correction models) lead to substantively similar results (Appendix 4).  
Finally, we repeated our analysis by focusing on the population of working age instead 
of prime working ages. Besides, we estimated separate models for men and women, because 
there is a vast literature that describes that labour supply elasticities of men and women are 
different (see for an overview and meta-analysis: Evers et al. 2008). When focusing on these 
slightly different groups we obtain rather similar results (Appendix 5).  
 
4.4 Policy complementarities 
Within the social investment literature different scholars have paid attention to what are 
generally called ‘institutional complementarities’. Although it is possible to discern two types 
of institutional complementarities the term has been used to describe both. On the one hand 
individual policies can have complementary effects over the life course. Such temporal 
complementarities result from the fact that policies positively affect individual opportunities at 
a certain stage of the life course and thereby improve the effectiveness of other policies at a 
later stage. Early childhood policies concern a clear example. By stimulating cognitive 
development such programmes can magnify the positive effects of policies concerned with skill 
acquisition at later stages of the life course, such as education throughout middle childhood and 
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adolescence and training programmes during adulthood. On the other hand policies can 
complement each other by being targeted toward the same goal. Within the literature these 
institutional complementarities have also been referred to as ‘life-course synergies’ and ‘policy 
synergies’ (Hemerijck et al. 2016) or complementarity ‘between’ and ‘within’ the different 
functions (flow, stock and buffer) of social investment (Dräbing and Nelson 2017).  
The characteristics of our data do not enable us to examine cumulative effects of 
individual policies over the life course. We are therefore interested in the second type of 
institutional complementarity here, which has also been examined by Hemerijck et al. (2016) 
and partly by Thévenon (2016). Although the complementarity of individual policies is partly 
a matter of institutional design, we only test whether simultaneous efforts on certain policy 
combinations have a complementary effect on employment outcomes. In order to avoid 
ambiguity we have therefore preferred to refer to ‘policy complementarities’ rather than 
‘institutional complementarities’. We analyse the complementarity of social policies by 
augmenting our regressions with interaction effects. As the inclusion of multiplicative 
interaction terms affects the interpretation of constitutive terms (Braumoeller 204; Brambor et 
al. 2006; Franzese and Kam 2007), we examine the interaction effects using marginal effect 
plots.17 We have systematically considered all possible interactions and summarised the results 
obtained for the population of prime working age in Table 4.18  
As shown by this table we obtain statistically significant interaction effects for just two 
policy combinations: those between effort on social investment oriented ALMPs, on the one 
hand, and effort on care for the elderly and frail and early childhood policies, on the other hand. 
For several of the other interactions effects there are signs of interaction as marginal effects 
clearly change across the range of the moderating variable. These changes in marginal effect 
are, however, not statistically significant, because the upper (lower) border of the confidence 
interval on the left side of the figure (lower range of the moderating variable) overlaps with the 
lower (upper) border of the confidence interval on the right side of the figure (upper range of 
the moderating variable). Moreover, marginal effects are often not statistically different from 
zero in these cases. 
Note that other scholars obtained rather similar results when using this approach. 
Hemerijck et al. (2016) examined the institutional complementarity of ALMPs and ECEC with  
                                                          
17
 Following conventions, the range of the moderating variable excludes the lower and upper five per cent of 
observations.  
18
 We conducted this analysis using employment rates of the male and female population of prime working age as 
dependent variable as well. The results are highly similar and summarised in Table A8. 
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Table 4 Interaction effects for effort on social investment policies 
Statistically significant interaction effects Interaction effects that are not statistically significant because the marginal effect … 
 … does not change significantly … is never distinguishable from zero 
 
ALMPs 
 
 
ALMPs 
 
× 
 
 
× 
 
care for the elderly 
and frail 
 
early childhood 
policies 
 
ALMPs 
  
ALMPs 
 
 
Care for the elderly 
and frail 
 
Care for the elderly 
and frail 
 
Care for the elderly 
and frail 
 
Early childhood 
policies 
 
 
× 
 
× 
 
 
× 
 
 
× 
 
 
× 
 
 
× 
 
education 
 
maternity and parental 
leave 
 
early childhood 
policies1 
 
education2 
 
 
maternity and parental 
leave3 
 
education4 
 
Early childhood 
policies 
 
Education  
 
× 
 
 
× 
 
 
maternity and parental 
leave 
 
maternity and parental 
leave 
Notes: All marginal effects plots are computed using 95% confidence intervals; 
An interaction effect is considered statistically significant if the marginal effect is distinguishable from zero for at least some values of the 
moderating policy and if the change in marginal effect over the range of the moderating variable is statistically significant; 
For several interactions we find that the marginal effect is distinguishable from zero for all or some values of the moderating policy, but they are 
not statistically significant because the upper (lower) confidence interval of the marginal effect at lower range of the moderating variable overlap 
with the lower (upper) confidence interval at higher range of moderating variable 
1 The marginal effect is indistinguishable from zero when effort on care for the elderly and frail is less than approximately 5% and more than 
approximately 25% of GDP per capita (min. = 1.32%; mean = 12.38%; max. = 32.40%); 
2 The marginal effect is indistinguishable from zero when effort on education is more than approximately 22% of GDP per capita (mean = 23.92%); 
3 The marginal effect is indistinguishable from zero when effort on maternity and parental leave is more than approximately 17% of GDP per capita 
(mean = 22.76); 
4 The marginal effect is indistinguishable from zero when effort on education is less than approximately 22% of GDP per capita (mean = 23.92%) 
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regard to employment rates for a comparable time-series cross section of countries using an 
interaction between the two policies and find that they “tend to interact positively though not 
significantly with one another in their implications for national employment rates” (p. 76). 
Similarly, Thévenon (2017) examined the interplay between five policies (spending on leave 
and birth grants per childbirth, spending on family benefits, spending on childcare services, 
weeks of paid leave, and enrolment in formal childcare) with regard to female employment by 
augmenting his baseline model with all possible policy interactions. The results obtained from  
this approach likewise “provide little evidence that policies complement each other ... [although 
this] lack of statistical significance regarding many of the ‘paired interaction terms’ does not 
necessarily mean that institutions do not interact.” (pp. 483-484). 
We have presented the marginal effect plots of our significant interactions in Figure 1 
and Figure 2. The second interaction, that between effort on social investment oriented ALMPs 
and childhood policies, was examined by Hemerijck et al. (2016) as well. They argue that 
ALMPs are more effective in stimulating employment when countries foresee in childcare, 
thereby enabling labour market entrants or newly hired employees to reconcile work and family. 
A similar argument can be assumed to apply to effort on care for the elderly and frail – the first 
interaction. Figures 1 and 2 seem to challenge this argument. The marginal effects of effort on 
ALMPs on employment are positive in both cases, but get smaller at higher levels of effort on 
care for the elderly and frail and effort on early childhood policies respectively. This suggests 
that in the presence of relatively high efforts on care for the elderly and frail and early childhood 
policies, part of the positive association between ALMPs and employment is captured by these 
policies, as the provision of care also stimulates employment. Instead of a complementary 
effect, which would involve upward sloping marginal effects, our results suggest diminishing 
marginal returns.   
These results could potentially be understood in terms of ‘limits of growth’ as well. 
Particularly Nordic welfare states are known for their generous efforts on policies concerned 
with care, on the one hand, and high (female) employment rates, on the other hand. Studies 
have found that (female) labour supply elasticities have decreased over time due to increasing 
participation (Blau and Kahn 2007; Heim 2007). Moreover, countries with higher participation 
rates have smaller elasticities (Bargain et al. 2014). This might explain why the positive effects 
are smaller in countries characterised by high efforts. In order to further examine this issue we 
distinguish our policy interaction across welfare state regimes as well.  
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4.5 Policy complementarities and institutional complementarity across welfare state 
regimes 
To further scrutinise the policy complementarities associated with social investment, we also 
examine the interaction effects across different welfare state regimes. The question whether 
social investment “delivers the wished-for socio-economic outcomes (…) [depends] on the 
institutional and economic context of [countries] that greatly differ from each other” (Ronchi 
2018, p. 16). For instance, relatively distinct regimes have been distinguished with regard to 
the provision and financing of care services for children and the elderly (Anttonen and Sipilä 
1996; Daly and Lewis 2000; Bettio and Plantenga 2004). Interestingly, such regimes are found 
to be associated with different employment models (e.g. Simonazzi 2009). So, by distinguishing 
between welfare regimes, it is possible to examine whether the complementarity of policy 
combinations is contingent on broader configurations of institutional characteristics.  
The idea that the effect of individual institutions is contingent on the entire framework 
of institutions can be traced to Bassanini and Duval (2009), who estimate a non-linear 
specification in which each institution of their empirical model is interacted with the overall 
institutional framework, defined as the sum of direct effects of all institutions. Thévenon (2016) 
implemented this approach to examine whether the effect of individual policy instruments is 
contingent on the overall institutional framework. Subsequently, he examines whether the 
effects of policies differ across countries by interacting the policy variables with regime 
dummies. Instead of estimating the non-linear specification suggested by Bassanini and Duval 
(2009) we built on our multiplicative interactions of two policies. We adopt an approach quite 
similar to Thévenon (2016) by distinguishing our interaction effects across welfare state 
regimes, which is implemented by interacting our policy interactions with welfare state 
dummies that capture common characteristics of welfare states belonging to the same regime. 
Again, the results of these interactions are presented using marginal effect plots.  
In Figure 3 and Figure 4 we distinguish the interactions presented in Figure 1 and Figure 
2 distinguished by welfare regime. We display only these interactions for two reasons. First, 
this concerns the interactions for which we obtained statistically significant findings when 
focusing on the entire sample of countries. Second, these interactions are also only ones that 
provide statistically significant results by welfare state regime. For the other policy interactions 
marginal effects are generally not significantly different from zero in any of the welfare states 
regimes, marginal effects are significantly different from zero in only one or a few of the 
regimes for certain levels of effort on the moderating policies, or the marginal effects do not 
change significantly over the range of the moderating policies.  
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Note that Figure 1 and Figure 2 suggest diminishing marginal returns of effort on 
ALMPs as effort on care for the elderly and frail and early childhood policies intensify. Figure 
3 shows that this finding holds across all welfare states, except the Mediterranean ones. 
Likewise, Figure 4 shows that these diminishing marginal returns hold across all welfare states, 
except the conservative and Mediterranean where we do find the complementary interaction 
effect described by Hemerijck et al. (2016). Conservative welfare states have been characterised 
by limited availability of childcare (Flynn 2017), which could therefore explain the observed 
Mediterranean welfare states have been characterised by traditionally low levels of employment 
– particularly amongst women – that thereby offer stronger potential for social investment 
policies (Hemerijck 2017b), especially considering the fact that these countries are 
characterised by larger elasticities of labour supply (Bargain et al. 2014).  
The figures presented here show that it is easier to disentangle interaction effects when 
focusing on specific groups of welfare states. More generally, the figures show that the 
complementarity of policies varies across regimes. The variety of the interaction plots across 
regimes (irrespective of the policy interaction being studied) stresses that the way in which 
policies interact is contingent on the underlying institutions associated with different welfare 
state regimes.  Further, it is worth stressing that the interaction plots suggest positive but 
diminishing marginal returns for the Nordic welfare states. This does not come as a great 
surprise as the descriptive data and cited literature all show that these welfare states are the most 
generous when it comes to the provision of (service-oriented) social investment policies and at 
the same time experience the highest levels of (female) labour market participation. In such 
countries, the potential of higher efforts on these policies is therefore limited. Hence the lower 
likelihood of finding complementary effects. This, moreover, suggest that, given underlying 
institutional configurations, optimal levels of effort exist when it comes to the generosity of 
social investment policies.  
 
4.6 Social investment and the kind of employment realised 
In the second part of our time-series cross-section regression analysis we focus on outcomes 
that have been discussed in literature on non-standard employment (part-time employment and 
temporary employment; Kalleberg 2000; Hipp et al. 2015) or were studied before in the social 
investment literature (employment in knowledge-intensive sectors; Nelson and Stephens 2012). 
In addition, we also examine the relationship between social investment and indices of job 
quality. Given the lack of time-series of cross-sectional data, these analyses are not suited for 
inferential analyses and based on bivariate correlation plots instead.   
33 
4.6.1 Full-time employment 
We first examine whether social investment is associated with the extent to which people work 
either full-time or part-time. Part-time work is often associated with low paid or low status jobs 
(Kalleberg 2000) and could therefore constitute a proxy of low quality jobs. The first column 
of Table 5 presents the results obtained when regressing the share of full-time employees as a 
percentage of the sum of both full-time and part-time employees on effort on social investment 
policies as well as the labour market institutions and socioeconomic factors considered before. 
Hence, we investigate the extent to which the aforementioned factors are capable of explaining 
variation in the prevalence of full-time employment.19   
For effort on care for the elderly and frail we obtain a negative coefficient. In 
combination with the previous results in Table 3, this suggests that effort on this policy is 
associated with higher employment levels, albeit higher incidences of part-time employment. 
In combination with the negative estimates for the aged population, this result could be 
interpreted as follows: increased effort on the public provision of care for the elderly and frail 
enables people who would otherwise take care of these people to enter the labour market, but 
given continued care responsibilities they reconcile work and family by working part-time. The 
results for effort on early childhood policies seem to suggest that increased effort on the public 
provision of care for young children allows employees to increase their labour market 
participation along the intensive margin by working full-time instead of part-time.  
We do not find any statistically significant associations for effort on education. This 
does not come as a surprise, because education mainly concerns investments in human capital 
that enable one to participate, irrespective of the intensity of such participation (unlike other 
social investment policies that affect the work-life balance). With respect to maternity and 
parental leave we obtain positive associations with full-time employment shares. A potential 
explanation could be that such leave arrangements enable mothers to return to their pre-
childbirth (full-time) job, instead of finding a new job that is more likely to entail a reduced 
working week given changed preferences now that they have a child.  
For some of the control variables we obtain interesting results as well. Higher levels of 
EPL tend to involve relatively more full-time employment, whereas the positive coefficient 
estimates for the tax wedge suggest that income effects outweigh substitution effects associated 
                                                          
19
 When regressing the share of part-time employees on the same set of variables we obtain similar estimates, but 
the signs are opposite. These results have not been presented, because they are interchangeable: a positive 
(negative) sign in relation to full-time employment entails a negative (positive) sign with regard to part-time 
employment. 
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with the taxation of labour income. In contrast, favourable economic conditions are associated 
with a lower share of full-time employment.  
 
4.6.2 Involuntary part-time employment 
Next we explore whether social investment policies are capable of explaining variation in the 
prevalence of involuntary part-time employment. This is probably a better indicator of the 
quality of employment than simply the share of people working part-time, because people might 
work part-time voluntarily or even prefer part-time work over full-time work as it allows them 
to reconcile work and family. In this respect Kalleberg (2000), however, found that most of the 
increase in part-time work throughout the last decades is the result of increasing numbers of 
employees that would prefer to work full-time. Note that the number of observations for this 
model is substantially lower than for the previous model. This is to a large extent due to the fact 
that these regressions exclude Switzerland, because of a lack of data on involuntary part-time 
employment. 
 The negative estimate obtained for effort on social investment oriented ALMPs 
substantiates the proposition that these policies are capable of realising better employment 
outcomes. For all the other social investment policies we fail to obtain any statistically 
significant coefficients. In addition to the results obtained for EPL in relation to the share of 
employees working full-time, the results from this model suggest that employment protection 
not only leads to lower levels of part-time employment, but also lower levels of involuntary 
part-time employment. This might be the result of the better bargaining positions that protected 
workers (‘insiders’) acquire vis-à-vis their employers due to employment protection. Again, we 
obtain a negative estimate for real GDP per capita. This result is not very surprising, because 
people are classified as working part-time involuntarily if they usually work full-time but work 
part-time because of economic slack, usually work part-time but work fewer hours than usual 
because of economic slack or work part-time because full-time work could not be found (OECD 
2014a).  
 
4.6.3 Permanency of the job 
Subsequently we examine whether efforts on social investment policies are associated with the 
quality of employment in terms of permanency of the job. The lower number of observations is 
due to the fact that there is no data on employment by contract type for the USA. As witnessed 
from the third column of Table 5 we hardly obtain any statistically significant correlations 
between effort on social investment policies and the share of employees with a permanent  
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Table 5 Regressions of the kind of employment realised and effort on social investment 
policies, 1990-2010 
 
Full-time 
employment 
Involuntary 
part-time 
employment 
Permanent 
employment 
Employment 
in knowledge-
intensive 
sectors 
Effort on social investment policies     
Active labour market policiest-1   0.00 –0.47*** –0.03 –0.02*** 
 (0.01)  (0.13)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
Care for the elderly and frailt-1 –0.20** –0.05   0.10   0.06 
 (0.08)  (0.58)  (0.10)  (0.04) 
Early childhood policiest-1   0.07* –0.33 –0.03   0.03* 
 
 (0.04)  (0.29)  (0.05)  (0.02) 
Educationt-1 –0.03   0.30 –0.04   0.08*** 
 
 (0.04)  (0.28)  (0.05)  (0.02) 
Maternity and parental leavet-1   0.01*   0.02   0.01   0.01 
 (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Labour market institutions     
Employment protection legislationt-1   0.60*** –8.82* –0.69   0.60*** 
 (0.23)  (4.58)  (0.53)  (0.21) 
Tax wedget-1   0.11***   0.19 –0.01 –0.06*** 
 
 (0.04)  (0.38)  (0.06)  (0.02) 
Unemployment benefitst-1 –0.03 –0.27   0.00   0.01 
 
 (0.02)  (0.27)  (0.03)  (0.01) 
Trade union densityt-1 –0.02 –0.49 –0.05 –0.00 
 
 (0.03)  (0.32)  (0.05)  (0.02) 
Coordination of wage bargainingt-1    0.02 –0.59 –0.13 –0.22*** 
 (0.17)  (1.26)  (0.15)  (0.08) 
Socioeconomic factors     
Young dependent population <15t-1   0.20 –0.38   0.36*   0.49*** 
 (0.16)  (1.07)  (0.19)  (0.07) 
Old dependent population ≥65t-1   –0.73*** –1.07 –0.32*   0.45*** 
 (0.14)  (1.26)  (0.16)  (0.08) 
Capital openesst-1   0.00   0.01 –0.00 –0.00 
 
 (0.00)  (0.04)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Trade opennesst-1  –0.03*** –0.06   0.01   0.01* 
 
 (0.01)  (0.07)  (0.01)  (0.00) 
Real GDP per capitat-1 –0.11** –0.68**   0.13** –0.04 
 
 (0.05)  (0.27)  (0.05)  (0.03) 
Shocks in labour demand 10.38      –45.54     0.53 –5.87 
 
 (6.39)       (66.59)      (10.23)  (4.94) 
     
Constant 89.23***  91.20** 93.82*** 18.99*** 
 
 (5.30) (41.51)  (5.47)  (2.74) 
     
Number of observations 334 301 294 317 
Adjusted R-squared 0.997 0.678 0.995 0.995 
Rho 0.560 0.524 0.590 0.609 
Notes: 
 
All regression include country and year fixed effects (not presented here); panel-corrected 
standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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contract. This might not be of great surprise given that most studies on temporary employment 
have exclusively focused on the role of employment protection (Hipp et al. 2015). For most of 
our control variables we neither find statistically significant correlations. Based on the 
statistically significant estimate of GDP per capita it seems that employers are more likely to 
hire workers on a permanent contract when economic conditions are positive. 
 
4.6.4 Employment in knowledge-intensive sectors 
The fourth column of Table 5 presents a model in which we examine the relationship between 
effort on social investment policies and the share of employees working in knowledge-intensive 
sectors, following Nelson and Stephens (2012).20 The negative coefficient estimate for ALMPs 
suggests that despite the positive employment effects associated with effort on these policies, 
these programmes are less focused on the type of sector in which employment is realised. At 
the same time there might be some self-selection amongst participants of active labour market 
programmes as well. If people working in sectors that are not knowledge-intensive tend to 
experience higher incidences of unemployment, these sectors will also be characterised by 
relatively higher employment increases as a results of participation in these programmes. 
Interestingly, we obtain positive coefficient estimates for effort on early childhood policies and 
education. According to these results, policies aimed at human capital development are 
                                                          
20
 According to Eurostat and the OECD (2017d) the following ISIC Rev. 4 (Rev. 3.1) and NACE Rev. 2 (1.1) 
divisions are considered knowledge-intensive sectors (high-tech manufacturing and knowledge-intensive 
services): Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations (21), Manufacture of 
computer, electronic and optical products (26), Water transport (50), Air transport (51), Information and 
communication (58 to 63, category J), Financial and insurance activities (64 to 66, K), Professional, scientific and 
technical activities (69 to 75, M), Employment activities (78), Public administration and defence and compulsory 
social security (84 to 88, O), and Arts, entertainment and recreation (90 to 93, R).  
We calculated the share of employees working in knowledge-intensive sectors as the share of employees working 
in these divisions as a percentage of all employees using data from the OECD Database for Structural Analysis 
(STAN) (OECD 2011; 2018b). Note that for some countries data on certain divisions is not available (21 and 78 
for Estonia, 78 for Ireland and 90 to 93 for New Zealand), whereas for some countries data is based on an older 
(regional) classification (Canada and USA prior to 1998, Japan, and Switzerland prior to 2009).  
Both exclusive (r = 0.76; p < 0.01 ) and inclusive (r = 0.79; p < 0.01 ) operationalisations of employment in 
knowledge-intensive services based on EU KLEMS data (the November 2009 release updated in March 2011 – 
see O’Mahony and Timmer 2009) are strongly correlated with our measure of employment in knowledge-intensive 
sectors. The exclusive definition (e.g. Hope and Martelli 2019) refers to people engaged with divisions 64 (Post 
and telecommunications), 65 to 67 (Finance and insurance) and 71 to 74 (Renting of machinery and equipment 
and other business activities), whereas the inclusive definition (Wren 2013) captures the share of people employed 
in services classified as dynamic and ICT intensive, which includes sectors I (Transport, storage and 
communications; 60 to 64), J (Financial intermediation; 65 to 67) and K (Real estates, renting and business 
activities; 70 to 74). Note that apart from employment in knowledge-intensive sectors, our measure additionally 
includes employment in high-tech manufacturing, which is also knowledge-intensive (e.g. Rohrbach 2009), as 
well as services that are less ICT intensive (non-dynamic services such as Community, social and personal services 
and ‘welfare’ services such as Public administration, Education, Health and Social work – Wren 2013). We decided 
not to base our indicator on EU KLEMS, because consistent time series are available up to 2007 only and it 
provides no data for Canada, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland. 
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associated with higher employment in knowledge-intensive sectors. This suggests that such 
policies indeed affect the quality of employment (by improving the stock of human capital) 
instead of the quantity (for which we obtained practically no statistically significant results).  
 The positive estimates for the aged and young population might have to do with the fact 
that our measure of employment in knowledge-intensive sectors includes education (ISIC Rev. 
4 division 85; Section P), human health activities (division 86), residential care activities 
(division 87) and social work activities without accommodation (division 88) (together Section 
Q). These estimates might therefore reflect a demographic effect: the larger the share of the 
dependent population, the higher the demand for services for these people and thus the higher 
the level of employment in sectors providing such services. Note that more open economies 
tend to be associated with higher rates of employment in knowledge-intensive sectors. Stronger 
employment protection and employment in knowledge-intensive sectors are also positively 
correlated. There is a high chance that regimes characterised by strong protection foster 
investments in human capital – and thereby positively affect employment in knowledge-
intensive sectors – by firms as the relatively lower job separation and job finding rates in such 
regimes guarantee prolonged job tenure.   
 
4.7.5 Indices of job quality 
Finally, we also examine the relationship between effort on social investment policies and 
indices of job quality. Although several quantitative comparable measures of job quality exist 
by now, geographical coverage is limited and for most indicators cross-sections of data are 
available for limited points of time (see for an overview: Muñoz de Bustillo et al. 2011). As a 
result of this, the available observations are too few to conduct statistical analysis. The 
following analyses are therefore predominantly descriptive and based on bivariate correlations.  
An indicator that covers several dimensions of job quality and that is available for a 
relatively large cross-section of countries is the European Job Quality Index (EJQI) (Leschke 
et al. 2008; Leschke and Watt 2014). The EJQI is a normalised index of wages and five non-
wage dimensions: forms of employment and job security, working time and work-life balance, 
working conditions, skills and career development, and collective interest representation. 
Unfortunately, the geographical coverage of this indicator is confined to EU member states 
only. The indicator is available for three points of time: 2005 (Leschke and Watt 2008), 2010 
(Leschke et al. 2012), and 2015 (Piasna 2017). The underlying (disaggregated) data are, 
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however, not publicly available.21 In addition, the index has been further crystallised over time, 
whereby slightly different specifications have been used. Consequently, the different versions 
cannot directly be contrasted. These caveats notwithstanding, overall EJQI indices rounded to 
two decimals are available for 2010 and 2015 from Leschke et al. (2012) and Piasna (2017). 
Since previous analyses were focused on the period 1990-2010 we use the EJQI for 2010, which 
is available for 20 EU countries.  
As stated previously, the EU and OECD have concentrated economic and labour market 
policy towards realising ‘more and better jobs’. Figure 5 presents a bivariate scatterplot of 
employment rates for the population or prime working age and the EJQI, both for the year 2010. 
This figure suggests that there are indeed positive synergies between more and better jobs (r = 
0.45; p < 0.05).22 Subsequently we have plotted a bivariate correlation of job quality in the year 
2010 and average expenditures on social investment over the period 1990-2010 in Figure 6. 
This shows a positive cross-country correlation between average expenditures on social 
investment policies throughout the period 1990-2010 and 2010 levels of job quality, which 
suggests that social investment policies are not only associated with more, but also better jobs 
(r = 0.67; p < 0.01).23 
Recently, the OECD has also started to study job quality using quantitative indicators. 
As a part of this, the 2014 Employment Outlook (OECD 2014b) introduced the OECD Job 
Quality Framework. Additional details about this framework are provided by Cazes et al. 
(2015). The framework approaches job quality along three broad dimensions and a total of ten 
items: earnings quality (average earnings and earnings inequality), labour market security (with 
regard to both unemployment risk and insurance), and quality of the work environment 
measured by the incidence of job strain among employees (covering job demands: physical 
health risk factors, long working hours, and inflexibility of working hours; and job resources: 
work autonomy and learning opportunities, training and learning, and opportunities for career 
advancement). For European countries data on indicators that together constitute job strain is 
from the European Working Conditions Survey, which has been conducted every five years 
since 1990. For non-European countries, data is from the Work Orientations module of the  
                                                          
21
 Further, Leschke and Watt (2008) summarise the EJQI for 2005 using a figure. The exact values can hence not 
be retrieved for this year. 
22
 Without Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden the positive correlation remains, although it is less strong and 
no longer statistically significant (r = 0.23; p > 0.1). When additionally excluding Greece the correlation is still 
positive, but very weak and insignificant (r = 0.08; p > 0.1). 
23
 When excluding the Nordic welfare states (Denmark, Finland and Sweden) and Greece the correlation remains, 
although it is less strong (r = 0.44; p < 0.1). 
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International Social Survey Program for which waves were conducted in 1989, 1997, 2005 and 
2015 (Cazes et al. 2015).  
A serious caveat of the OECD framework, which also applies to several other indicators 
(Muñoz de Bustillo et al. 2011), is that it provides no aggregate measure of job quality but only 
offers a system of indicators. Both OECD (2014a) and Cazes et al. (2015) provide relative 
rankings of countries for the three main dimensions instead of an overall score. This obviously 
limits the extent to which analysts can make comparisons across countries. We address this gap 
by creating a composite index of job quality in the years 2010 using the data collected within 
the OECD Job Quality Framework. Available data on the three dimensions were first 
normalised. Given the lack of data on job strain for non-European countries in 2010, the 
available data for the year 2005 are used for these countries instead. Data on the three 
dimensions is available for 27 OECD countries. In comparison to the 26 OECD countries 
studied for the regression analyses this excludes Switzerland and additionally includes Greece 
and Korea. Subsequently, an overall index was calculated by subtracting the normalised values 
for labour market insecurity and the quality of the work environment (both negatively framed 
items in the OECD framework) from the normalised value for earnings quality (which is 
positive framed). This yields a variable with a range from –1.57 to 0.87. In order to obtain a 
more meaningful index, these values have also been normalised, resulting in a relative job index 
that ranges from zero to one whereby higher values indicate better job quality. For EU member 
states this index of job quality for OECD countries is strongly correlated to the EJQI (r = 0.71, 
p < 0.01). 
Figure 7 again provides a bivariate scatterplot of employment rates for the population 
or prime working age and the OECD index of relative job quality, both for the year 2010. Like 
Figure 5, this suggests that there are positive synergies between more and better jobs (r = 0.69; 
p < 0.01).24 Subsequently we have also plotted a bivariate correlation of average expenditures 
on social investment over the period 1990-2010 and our indicator of job quality in Figure 8. 
Once more, the positive cross-country correlation between average expenditures on social 
investment throughout the period 1990-2010 and 2010 levels of job quality suggests that social 
investment policies are not only associated with more, but also with better jobs (r = 0.62; p < 
0.01). 25  
                                                          
24
 Even when excluding the main outliers Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands and Norway, the positive correlation 
remains (r = 0.56; p < 0.01).  
25
 Without the Nordic welfare states (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) the positive correlation remains, 
although it is less strong (r = 0.52; p < 0.05). When additionally excluding Greece the correlation becomes even 
less strong, but it remains statistically significant (r = 0.39; p < 0.1). 
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5. Conclusion and discussion 
Our comparative analysis provides varied mixed results for the positive employment effects 
hypothesised for the different social investment policies. In general, we find partial signs of 
positive associations between effort on social investments policies and employment outcomes, 
but there is heterogeneity amongst the different social investment policies and the outcomes 
being considered. Regarding the level of employment, we obtain positive estimates for effort 
on social investment oriented ALMPs and care for the elderly and frail, whereas we obtain 
negative estimates for effort on maternity and parental leave. These associations are robust to 
different operationalisations of the social investment policies as well as different model 
specifications and estimation techniques. For effort on education we generally fail to obtain 
statistically significant effects. We practically never obtain any statistically significant 
coefficient estimates for early childhood policies. Note that while our findings do not provide 
support for all the positive associations discussed in the literature, they do corroborate earlier 
findings. For example, Bradley and Stephens (2007) and Nelson and Stephens (2012) found 
positive associations between ALMPs and employment as well, whereas Hemerijck et al. 
(2016), for instance, also fail to find a positive correlation between expenditures on early 
childhood policies and employment. 
Another contribution of our study concerns the examination of policy and institutional 
complementarities. Although the interactions between policies and the underlying institutions 
have been stressed in the social investment literature, such empirical tests of complementarity 
are still limited. Hemerijck et al. (2016) constitute a notable exception, but solely investigate 
the complementarity of two policies and remain rather inconclusive by stating that the “much 
talked-about interaction does not shine through clearly” (p. 76). We contribute to this literature 
by systematically examining the complementarity of all combinations of the social investment 
policies we distinguish. Our examination of policy complementarities indicates that, out of the 
ten combinations of two social investment policies, few show signs of interaction at all. If the 
policies do show signs of interaction, the marginal effects often do not indicate statistically 
significant changes along the range of the moderating policies. Only for ALMPs we observe 
marginal effects that change significantly as effort on the moderating policies changes. In 
general, our interaction plots suggest diminishing marginal returns: as effort on the moderating 
policies increases, the marginal effect of effort on ALMPs diminishes. We believe this might 
mean that part of the positive association between ALMPs and employment is captured by the 
moderating policies, because these are also aimed at increasing labour market participation and 
stimulating employment.  
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Additional analyses that distinguish these policy interactions across welfare state 
regimes indicate that the way in which policies interact is contingent on the underlying 
institutions associated with these different welfare regimes. With regard to the interaction 
between ALMPs and early childhood policies, we do for instance find complementary effects 
for Mediterranean and conservative welfare states. This more closely resembles the conclusion 
drawn by Hemerijck et al. (2016). Moreover, these regimes have been considered as the regimes 
with the most potential for social investment (Hemerijck 2017b; Kazepov and Ranci 2016). In 
addition, distinguishing these interactions by welfare state regimes gives reason to believe that 
potential effects of social investment policies are smaller in countries with high employment 
rates that – as a result thereof – tend to have relatively small elasticities of labour supply 
(Bargain et al. 2014). 
Finally, we explore whether there are any signs of positive synergies between more and 
better jobs. Due to a lack of adequate time-series cross-sections of data, we use proxies of job 
quality to statistically examine whether there are positive associations between effort on social 
investment policies and qualitative aspects of the employment outcomes realised. These 
analyses yield few statistically significant estimates for the different social investment policies. 
Nevertheless, the results give reason to believe that more generous effort on ALMPs might 
result in better job matches in terms of the number of hours worked per week. In addition, the 
analyses suggest that effort on care for the elderly and frail enables people to enter the labour 
market, albeit by working part-time. The same seems to hold for effort on early childhood 
policies. Besides, it seems that leave arrangements enable mothers to return to their pre-
childbirth (full-time) job, instead of finding a new (part-time) job after giving birth. 
Furthermore, we obtain results that are comparable to those from Nelson and Stephens (2012) 
when it comes to the correlation between employment in knowledge-intensive sectors and effort 
on early childhood policies and education. In combination with previous results, this gives 
reason to believe that policies targeted at human capital development are positively associated 
with the quality of the labour force and hence the sectors in which people find a job rather than 
the overall number of people being employed. 
Apart from using proxies of job quality we also conduct analysis with two international 
indices of job quality. These explorative analyses based on bivariate correlations suggest that 
there are positive synergies between more and better jobs. Moreover, they show that 
contemporaneous values of job quality are correlated with effort on social investment policies 
throughout the preceding two decades.  
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Together, these findings have important implications for the understanding of social 
investment policy development. The life-course perspective of social investment is to some 
extent characterised by temporal mismatches between efforts and their returns. This not only 
complicates the estimation of outcomes attributable to some social investment policies, but also 
requires a high degree of ‘political patience’ (Ferrera 2016) that may not always be 
forthcoming. Yet, this problem does not equally apply to all policies, as effort on ALMPs for 
instance yield positive effects in the short run. Another point is that although social investment 
has been regarded an effective response to new social risks and the challenges faced by welfare 
states, the fiscal and political leeway for these responses has been increasingly limited as a 
result of budget constraints in a post-crisis era of austerity. Under such conditions, the 
reallocation of expenditures on passive transfers to expenditures on social investment policies 
is likely to entail substitution. Due to conflictive preferences, public support for such 
reallocation may be lacking (e.g. Garritzmann et al. 2018). As a result, further development and 
implementation of social investment policies is likely to be characterised by political decisions 
and trade-offs (Armingeon and Bonoli 2006; Bonoli and Natali 2012; Garritzmann et al. 
forthcoming). In addition, our findings regarding the varying complementarity across welfare 
state regimes suggest that the broader design of social policy and the institutional framework 
matter with regard to the outcomes that might be realised. A more country-specific approach 
that acknowledges differences in institutional, cultural and economic context might hence be 
desired when it comes to the promotion and implementation of social investment policies (cf. 
Bouget et al. 2015).  
Finally, two important limitations of our study need to be acknowledged. First, a 
substantial part of complementarity between policies stems from institutional design which is 
only partly captured by the current indicators measuring effort on the different policies. 
Qualitative analysis of institutional design should provide deeper insight into the 
complementarity between social investment policies. Second, social investment policies may 
yield substantial effects for specific groups (e.g. young parents) which would not be revealed 
in analyses of aggregated employment outcomes. Future analyses of disaggregated or micro 
data should provide more insight on this point. 
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Table A1 Dependent and explanatory variables for 26 OECD countries, 1990-2010 
Variable Measure N Mean SD Source(s) 
Dependent variables       
Employment rate (prime working age) People aged 25-54 in employment as a share of the total population aged 25-54 Total 538 78.33 5.66 OECD (2017a)  
 Male 538 86.58 4.27  
 Female 538 70.08 9.41  
Employment rate (working age) People aged 15-64 in employment as a share of the total population aged 15-64 Total 538 66.40 7.26 OECD (2017a)  
 Male 538 73.87 6.29  
 Female 538 58.98 9.54  
Labour market participation rate (prime 
working age) 
People aged 25-54 active on the labour market (employed or formally unemployed) 
as a share of the total population aged 25-54 
Total 538 83.93 4.54 OECD (2017a)  
Male 538 92.31 2.34  
Female 538 75.56 8.73  
Labour market participation rate 
(working age) 
People aged 15-64 active on the labour market (employed or formally unemployed) 
as a share of the total population aged 15-64 
Total 538 71.97 6.01 OECD (2017a)  
Male 538 79.76 4.83  
Female 538 64.21 8.49  
Full-time employment rate (prime 
working age) 
People aged 25-54 working full-time as a share all people aged 25-54 working 
either full-time or part-time 
Total 498 87.67 6.58 OECD (2017a)  
Male 498 96.35 1.50  
 Female 498 76.57 13.75  
Full-time employment rate (working age) People aged 15-64 working full-time as a share all people aged 15-64 working 
either full-time or part-time 
Total 498 85.43 7.23 OECD (2017a)  
Male 498 93.68 3.15  
 Female 498 74.92 13.15  
Part-time employment rate (prime 
working age) 
People aged 25-54 working part-time as a share all people aged 25-54 working 
either full-time or part-time 
Total 498 12.33 6.58 OECD (2017a)  
Male 498 3.65 1.50  
 Female 498 23.43 13.75  
Part-time employment rate (working age) People aged 15-64 working part-time as a share all people aged 15-64 working 
either full-time or part-time 
Total 498 14.57 7.23 OECD (2017a)  
Male 498 6.32 3.15  
 Female 498 25.08 13.15  
Involuntary part-time employment rate 
(prime working age) 
People aged 25-54 working part-time involuntarily as a share all people aged 25-54 
working part-time 
Total 431 27.38 14.68 OECD (2017a)  
Male 431 36.07 16.20  
Female 431 25.94 15.71  
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Involuntary part-time employment rate 
(working age) 
People aged 15-64 working part-time involuntarily as a share all people aged 15-64 
working part-time 
Total 431 24.43 12.14 OECD (2017a)  
Male 431 27.53 13.36  
 Female 430 23.80 12.94  
Permanent contract rate (prime working 
age) 
People aged 25-54 with a permanent contract as a share of all employees aged 25-
54 
Total 421 91.17 5.83 OECD (2017a)  
Male 421 92.58 5.74  
Female 421 89.36 6.63  
Permanent contract rate (working age) People aged 15-64 with a permanent contract as a share of all employees aged 15-
64 
Total 421 88.25 6.56 OECD (2017a)  
Male 421 89.54 6.37  
Female 421 86.59 7.31  
Employment in knowledge-intensive 
sectors rate 
People working in knowledge-intensive sectors as a share of all employees in the entire 
economy (‘number of persons engaged – total employment’, EMPN) 
473 38.15 7.21 OECD (2018b) 
OECD (2011) 
      
Independent variables      
Effort on active labour market policies  Sum of public and mandatory private expenditures on active labour market policies per  
   unemployed as a share of GDP per capita 
506 15.71 12.48 OECD (2018c)  
OECD (2017a)  
Effort on care for the elderly and frail  Sum of public and mandatory private expenditures on care for the elderly and frail per adult 
aged 65 and older as a share of GDP per capita 
531 5.01 5.51 OECD (2016a)  
UN DESA (2017) 
Effort on early childhood policies  Sum of public and mandatory private expenditures on early childhood policies per child  
   aged 0-5 as a share of GDP per capita 
453 12.03 6.96 OECD (2016a); 
UN DESA (2017) 
Effort on education Sum of expenditures from public, private and international sources on primary, secondary and 
tertiary education per student enrolled as a share of GDP per capita 
392 24.09 3.76 OECD (2014c) 
OECD (2014d)  
 
Effort on maternity and parental leave  Sum of public and mandatory private expenditures on maternity and parental leave per child  
   aged 0 as a share of GDP per capita 
536 26.99 24.04 OECD (2016a); 
UN DESA (2017) 
Employment protection legislation  Summary indicator of employment protection legislation based on the average of  
   protection for regular contracts (12 indicators) and temporary contracts (6 indicators) 
557 1.89 0.88 OECD (2016b)  
Avdagic (2012) 
Tax wedge  Amount of income taxes and social security contributions paid by the average production 
worker as a share of his gross wage; average of two family situations 
532 20.84 7.25 Van Vliet and 
Caminada (2012) 
Unemployment benefits Net replacement rate of unemployment benefits during the initial phase of unemployment; 
average of two family situations 
529 59.28 14.14 Van Vliet and 
Caminada (2012) 
Union density  Number of trade union members as a share of all wage and salary earners 560 34.74 20.43 Visser (2016) 
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Wage coordination  Five-point indicator of the coordination of wage setting: 
 5 =  economy wide bargaining by peak associations 
 4 =  mixed economy-wide and industry bargaining 
 3 = industry bargaining with no or irregular pattern setting 
 2 = mixed industry and firm-level bargaining 
 1 =  fragmented bargaining 
561 2.83 1.37 Visser (2016) 
Dependent population <15 Population younger than 15 as a share of the total population 572 17.95 3.25 UN DESA (2017) 
Dependent population ≥65 Population aged 65 and older as a share of the total population 572 14.62 2.33 UN DESA (2017) 
Capital openness Sum of inward and outward flows of foreign direct investment as a share of GDP 541 6.62 11.74 OECD (2017b) 
Trade openness  Sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP 562 83.39 59.18 OECD (2017c) 
Real GDP per capita (÷ 1000) Gross domestic product in 2010 constant PPP US dollar per capita 562 26.15 11.42 OECD (2017c) ; 
UN DESA (2017) 
Shocks in labour demand (× 1000)  The residual obtained when regressing the natural log of total 
employment on three lags of logged values of total employment, the 
log of real GDP and the log of real labour costs per employee by 
country (Nickell et al. 2005) 
Prime working age 
Working age 
512 0.08 7.80 OECD (2017a)  
OECD (2017c)  512 0.04 9.17 
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Table A2 Regressions of employment and effort on social investment policies, 1990-2010 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Effort on social investment policies       
Active labour market policiest-1 
 
  0.12***   0.13***   0.12***   0.13***   0.13*** 
 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Care for the elderly and frailt-1 –0.22***    0.15**   0.14**   0.18***   0.17** 
 (0.06) 
 
 (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.07) 
Early childhood policiest-1   0.04 –0.01  –0.04 –0.04 –0.04 
 
 (0.04)  (0.04) 
 
 (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.04) 
Educationt-1 –0.05 –0.05 –0.07  –0.10** –0.05 
 
 (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
 
 (0.05)  (0.05) 
Maternity and parental leavet-1 –0.03* –0.03** –0.03** –0.03**  –0.03** 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
 
 (0.01) 
Labour market institutions       
Employment protection legislationt-1   0.09 –0.22 –0.13   0.02   0.05 –0.05 
 (0.38)  (0.44)  (0.43)  (0.35)  (0.43)  (0.44) 
Tax wedget-1 –0.12*** –0.11*** –0.12*** –0.11*** –0.11*** –0.12*** 
 
 (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Unemployment benefitst-1   0.01 –0.01 –0.00 –0.01 –0.00 –0.00 
 
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Trade union densityt-1   0.07*   0.05   0.08**   0.06*    0.07*   0.07** 
 
 (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03) 
Coordination of wage bargainingt-1   0.21   0.16   0.20   0.14   0.19   0.20 
 (0.14)  (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.12)  (0.13)  (0.14) 
Socioeconomic factors       
Dependent population <15t-1 –0.54*** –0.65*** –0.70*** –0.64*** –0.72*** –0.71*** 
 (0.17)  (0.16)  (0.15)  (0.14)  (0.15)  (0.14) 
Dependent population ≥65t-1   0.53*   0.49**   0.52***   0.59***   0.55***   0.54*** 
 (0.27)  (0.21)  (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.21)  (0.20) 
Capital opennesst-1 –0.00 –0.00   0.00   0.00 –0.00 –0.00 
 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Trade opennesst-1    0.02**   0.01**   0.02**    0.02**    0.02***   0.02** 
 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Real GDP per capitat-1   0.28***   0.26***   0.28***    0.31***    0.29***   0.28*** 
 
 (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.07) 
Shocks in labour demand 32.60*** 33.09*** 35.93***  35.02*** 36.24*** 34.87*** 
 
(10.41)  (9.97)  (9.85)  (7.88)   (10.65) (10.36) 
       
Constant 78.92*** 80.68*** 78.38*** 75.52*** 78.67*** 78.53*** 
 
 (7.02)  (5.97)  (5.92)  (5.58)  (6.40)  (6.06) 
       
Number of observations 350 339 344 395 339 339 
Adjusted R-squared 0.990 0.992 0.991 0.989 0.991 0.991 
Rho 0.661 0.665 0.631 0.654 0.631 0.622 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
60 
Table A3 Interaction effects for effort on social investment policies 
Statistically significant interaction effects Interaction effects that are not statistically significant because the marginal effect … 
 … does not change significantly … is never distinguishable from zero 
Male population of prime working age 
 
ALMPs 
 
 
ALMPs 
 
× 
 
 
× 
 
care for the elderly 
and frail1 
 
early childhood 
policies 
 
ALMPs 
  
ALMPs 
 
 
Care for the elderly 
and frail 
 
Early childhood 
policies 
 
Education 
 
 
× 
 
× 
 
 
× 
 
 
× 
 
 
× 
 
 
education 
 
maternity and parental 
leave 
 
early childhood 
policies2 
 
education3 
 
 
maternity and parental 
leave 
 
 
Care for the elderly 
and frail 
 
Care for the elderly 
and frail 
 
Early childhood 
policies 
 
 
 
× 
 
 
× 
 
 
× 
 
 
 
education 
 
 
maternity and parental 
leave 
 
maternity and parental 
leave 
 
 
 
Female population of prime working age 
 
ALMPs 
 
 
 
 
× 
 
 
 
 
care for the elderly 
and frail4 
 
ALMPs 
 
 
ALMPs 
  
ALMPs 
 
 
Care for the elderly 
and frail 
 
Care for the elderly 
and frail 
 
Care for the elderly 
and frail 
 
 
× 
 
 
× 
 
× 
 
 
× 
 
 
× 
 
 
× 
 
 
 
early childhood 
policies 
 
education 
 
maternity and parental 
leave 
 
early childhood 
policies5 
 
education6 
 
 
maternity and parental 
leave7 
 
 
Early childhood 
policies 
 
Early childhood 
policies 
 
Education 
 
 
× 
 
 
× 
 
 
× 
 
 
 
 
 
education 
 
 
maternity and parental 
leave 
 
maternity and parental 
leave 
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Notes: All marginal effects plots are computed using 95% confidence intervals; 
An interaction effect is considered statistically significant if the marginal effect is distinguishable from zero for at least some values of the 
moderating policy and if the change in marginal effect over the range of the moderating variable is statistically significant; 
For several interactions we find that the marginal effect is distinguishable from zero for all or some values of the moderating policy, but they are 
not statistically significant because the upper (lower) confidence interval of the marginal effect at lower range of the moderating variable overlap 
with the lower (upper) confidence interval at higher range of moderating variable 
1 The marginal effect is indistinguishable from zero when effort on care for the elderly and frail is more than approximately 20% of GDP per capita 
(upper 95% of observations); 
2  The marginal effect is indistinguishable from zero when effort on early childhood policies is more than approximately 21% of GDP per capita; 
3  The marginal effect is indistinguishable from zero when effort on education is less than approximately 20% of GDP per capita; 
4 The marginal effect is indistinguishable from zero when effort on care for the elderly and frail is more than approximately 20% of GDP per capita 
(upper 95% of observations); 
5  The marginal effect is indistinguishable from zero when effort on early childhood policies is more than approximately 18% of GDP per capita; 
6  The marginal effect is indistinguishable from zero when effort on education is less than approximately 22% of GDP per capita only; 
7  The marginal effect is indistinguishable from zero when effort on maternity and parental leave is more than approximately 55% of GDP per 
capita 
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Appendix 1: Diagnostic tests 
An F-test suggests that the inclusion of country fixed effects suits the data better than simply 
pooling all data (F = 46.65, p < 0.01). A Breusch-Pagan LM test for random effects rejects the 
null hypothesis that the variance across panels is zero (Χ2 = 594.16, p < 0.01), therefore 
preferring the use of random effects over simply pooling. A Hausman test, nevertheless, 
indicates that specifying a random effects model is likely to yield inconsistent coefficients (Χ2 
= 46.86, p < 0.01). The fixed effects model is hence the preferred specification. An F-test 
suggests that the additional inclusion of year fixed effects significantly improves the model (F 
= 2.79, p < 0.01). Therefore, our preferred model includes country fixed effects to address 
omitted variables bias and cross-sectional heterogeneity of the intercepts as well as time fixed 
effects to account for unobserved time-varying shocks that affect all countries similarly. 
Several tests indicate that the data exhibits heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.26 
The use of panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) constitutes a conventional estimation 
technique commonly used to address simultaneous spatial correlation of the errors and panel 
heteroscedasticity (Beck and Katz 1995). To correct for autocorrelation and to produce serially 
independent errors, the error term 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is allowed to follow an AR(1) process, which specifies 
that there is first order autocorrelation within the panels. Specifying the AR(1) process, known 
as Prais-Winsten transformation, was preferred to the incorporation of a lagged dependent 
variable to address autocorrelation, because that (1) may obscure the relationship between the 
independent variables of substantive interest and the dependent variable by suppressing the 
power of other independent variables, (2) may in combination with the inclusion of unit fixed 
effects lead to a Nickell bias given the relatively small T, and (3) may overestimate the effect 
of the independent variables given the relatively high autoregressive parameter obtained for 
the error term (Wilkins 2017). 
Due to the focus on short-term effects, one year lags are used for all variables, except 
for shocks in labour demand, because it captures shocks that follow from regressing 
employment on its own lags. The use of one year lags can also be justified by that assumption 
                                                          
26
 A Wald test for groupwise heteroscedasticity (Χ2 = 4598.00, p < 0.01) and Breusch-Pagan test for 
heteroscedasticity (Χ2 = 16.99, p < 0.01) both indicate the presence of heteroscedasticity. In addition, 
Wooldridge’s test for autocorrelation indicates the presence of first-order serial correlation (F = 71.52, p < 0.01). 
A modified Bhargava, Franzini and Narendranathan (1982) Durbin-Watson test for serial correlation in the model 
with unit and time fixed effects derives the same conclusion as the obtained value (DWBFN = 0.405) is outside the 
lower and upper bounds of the critical values that can be used to test against the alternative of positive 
autocorrelation. See, however, Born and Breitung (2016) for the limitations of these tests). A Cumby-Huizinga 
test for multiple orders of autocorrelation with strictly exogenous regressors robust to heteroscedasticity even 
indicates the presence of serial correlation up to two lags (Χ2 = 49.87, p < 0.01, Χ2 = 24.83, p < 0.01) when 
including both unit and time fixed effects. 
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that policy, institutional and socioeconomic changes need some time to take effect and reveal 
themselves through changes in the (dependent) variable(s) that are affected. Moreover, lags are 
also commonly used to mitigate simultaneity (endogeneity) or reverse causality bias (see for a 
discussion: Reed 2015; Bellemare et al. 2017). 
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Appendix 2: Robustness checks using different operationalisations of effort on social 
investment policies 
To test the robustness of our results several subsequent analysis have been conducted in which 
slightly different indicators are used for some of the variables (Table A4), in which we include 
an additional indicator to test for omitted variable bias (Table A5), or where we use a different 
estimation technique (Tables A5 and A6). In order to facilitate comparison of the results 
obtained from the different models, the first column of Table A4 presents our preferred model. 
The second column presents the results we obtained when using only public expenditures 
(instead of the sum of public and mandatory private expenditures) for all social investment 
variables except for effort on education (as this would result in a major loss of observations). 
This excludes social programmes stipulated by legislation but operated through the private 
sectors such as payments by employers to sick employees as well as maternity and parental 
leave benefits and services financed by employers (Adema et al. 2011). Such programmes are 
however not very prevalent for the countries and period studied here. It is therefore not 
surprising that all results are replicated. In model 3 we include the sum of all active labour 
market programmes instead of only those programmes that reflect social investment aspects. 
This does not affect the estimates of our preferred model. In model 4 we use our original 
indicator of effort on ALMPs, but distinguish between the two categories ‘upskilling’ (training) 
and ‘employment assistance’ described by Bonoli (2010). Our results show that both training 
and employment assistance are positively associated with employment. In addition, none of 
our estimates – apart from the centralisation of wage bargaining – are affected. 
In model 5 we use a more inclusive definition of care for the elderly and frail, which 
also includes expenditures on rehabilitation services.27 Originally we did not consider such 
services social investments, because they are focused on ‘repairing’ personal damages instead 
of ‘preparing’ individuals for new social risks. Nevertheless, these services do prepare and 
support people to participate on the labour market again by mobilising and preserving skills 
and human capital, which would qualify them as social investment following the definition of 
Garritzmann et al. (2017). Again, our results are replicated. When using a more exclusive 
definition of early childhood policies that covers ECEC only, we obtain identical results (model 
6). In model 7 we examined the effect of using an alternative indicator for effort on education. 
In order to model the long-term returns of education we follow Nelson and Stephens (2012) 
and use cumulative average effort on education, calculated by dividing the cumulative sum of 
                                                          
27
 Incapacity-related rehabilitation services are included under category 3-2-3 of the SOCX database. 
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yearly expenditures per student over period tn by the number of years n that constitute period 
tn.28 The negative coefficient for effort on education is now statistically significant. In model 8 
we have estimated separate effects for effort on primary, secondary and tertiary education.29 
The impact on our results is limited. None of the other social investment policies are affected. 
Regarding the separate indicators for the different levels of education we obtain negative 
coefficient estimates, but none of them are statistically significant.  
So far we have estimated the employment effects of investments in human capital 
through effort on education, operationalised as expenditures per student as a share of GDP per 
capita. As has been noted, the positive effects of education are likely to materialise over the 
life course. It is therefore not surprising that we do not find any positive effects for education 
within the year following the (change in) effort. A better indicator might be educational 
attainment. This captures the quality of the ‘stock’ of human capital given previous efforts on 
education, both monetarily and regulatory. In columns 9 and 10 we therefore estimate our 
preferred model using educational attainment instead of effort on education (cf. Nelson and 
Stephens 2012).30 Data on educational attainment by 5-year age group is from Barro and Lee 
(2013). This series is available at five year intervals over the period 1950-2010. Attainment in 
intermediate years was estimated using linear interpolation. In line with our dependent variable, 
we measure educational attainment for the population aged 25-54 specifically. In model 9 we 
operationalise educational attainment as the number of people aged 25-54 that have attained at 
least primary education as a share of the total population aged 25-54. Model 10 uses the share 
of people that attained higher education (secondary and tertiary education), whereas model 11 
uses a slightly modified operationalisation that measures the number of people aged 25-54 that 
completed primary, secondary or tertiary education as a share of the total population aged 25-
54. For our three indicators of educational attainment we obtain positive estimates, which are  
                                                          
28
 Note that our use of effort deviates from Nelson and Stephens (2012), who simply focus on cumulative average 
expenditures. Also note that this results in a loss of nine observations. 
29
 This leads to an additional loss of fourteen observations as disaggregated expenditure data for education is 
available for fewer years.  
30
 In their analysis Nelson and Stephens (2012) operationalise educational attainment as the average years of 
education of the population above 25 available from Barro and Lee (2001). Theoretically they “expect the 
investment variables [cumulative average expenditures on ALMPs, public education and ECEC; all as a 
percentage of GDP] to operate entirely through their effect on human capital stock [average years of education]”, 
so that the former are not significant when including both the investment variables and stock variable in the 
regression analysis. Nonetheless, they state that “given the deficiencies of our stock variables, average years of 
education, this might not be the case” (Nelson and Stephens 2012, p. 214). When including their stock variable 
instead of the spending variables in model 4, Nelson and Stephens obtain a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient for average years of education. In their fifth model, that includes all these variables at the same time 
they no longer find a statistically significant effect for expenditures on education, whilst they obtain a statistically 
significant, positive effect for educational attainment. As they briefly suggested beforehand, the positive estimates 
for spending on ALMPs and ECEC remain (ibid, p. 220). 
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Table A4 Robustness checks of regressions of employment and effort on social investment policies, 1990-2010 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Effort on social investment policies 
   
      
    
Active labour market policiest-1        0.13***   0.13***   0.09***    0.13***   0.13***   0.12***   0.13***   0.11***   0.12***   0.12***   0.12***   0.10***   0.11*** 
 (0.01) 
 (0.01)  (0.01)   (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
  Trainingt-1           0.05**           
  
 
 
 (0.03)           
  Employment assistancet-1       0.21***           
  
 
 
 (0.02)           
Care for the elderly and frailt-1   0.17**   0.17**   0.14**   0.17**   0.17**   0.16**   0.15**    0.16*   0.10*   0.15**   0.13**   0.11*   0.11   0.23** 
 (0.07) 
 (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.12)  (0.10) 
Early childhood  policiest-1 –0.04 –0.04 –0.02 –0.04 –0.03 –0.01 –0.03 –0.01 –0.02 –0.04 –0.02 –0.07   0.01 –0.03 
 (0.04) 
 (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.07)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.04) 
Educationt-1    –0.05 –0.05 –0.08 –0.03 –0.05 –0.06        0.02 –0.13** –0.13* 
 
 (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
     
 (0.05) 
 (0.06)  (0.07) 
  Primaryt-1        –0.05       
       
  (0.04)       
  Secondaryt-1        –0.04       
       
  (0.03)       
  Tertiaryt-1        –0.00       
       
  (0.03)       
Education
 
(cumulative averages)
 t-1         –0.09***        
  
 
    
 (0.03)        
Educational attainmentt-1              0.34***   0.06***   0.19***    
  
 
      
 (0.08)  (0.02)  (0.05)    
Maternity and parental leavet-1 –0.03** –0.03** –0.03** –0.03** –0.03** –0.03** –0.04*** –0.03** –0.04*** –0.03** –0.03**  –0.05*** –0.05*** 
 (0.01)  
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)   (0.02)  (0.01) 
Generosity of maternity and parental 
leave (institutional)t-1 
 
 
        
 –0.01   
 
 
        
  (0.01)   
 
 
      
 
 
    
Labour market institutions 
 
      
 
 
    
Employment protection legislationt-1 –0.05 –0.04 –0.17 –0.01 –0.10 –0.10   0.25   0.30   0.17   0.22   0.17   0.15   1.49**   1.50*** 
 (0.44)  (0.44)  (0.49)  (0.45)  (0.43)  (0.45)  (0.41)  (0.48)  (0.34)  (0.36)   (0.36)   (0.52)  (0.58)  (0.55) 
Tax wedget-1 –0.12*** –0.12*** –0.11*** –0.13*** –0.12*** –0.12*** –0.11*** –0.13*** –0.11*** –0.12*** –0.11***   0.01 –0.12** –0.11** 
  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.05) 
Unemployment   benefitst-1 –0.00 –0.00   0.01 –0.01 –0.00 –0.00 –0.04 –0.02   0.00 –0.01 –0.01 –0.02 –0.04 –0.04 
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
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Trade union densityt-1   0.07**   0.07**   0.07**   0.07**   0.06*   0.07**   0.06**   0.07*   0.02   0.05   0.04 –0.06   0.06   0.10** 
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Coordination of wage bargainingt-1   0.20   0.20   0.19   0.24*   0.20   0.20   0.16   0.19   0.07   0.13   0.10   0.36***   0.54***   0.57*** 
 (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.15)  (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.17)  (0.17) 
  
 
      
 
 
    
Socioeconomic factors  
 
      
 
 
    
Dependent population <15t-1 –0.71*** –0.71*** –0.78*** –0.65*** –0.71*** –0.71*** –0.61*** –0.76*** –0.34** –0.55*** –0.41** –0.77*** –0.30 –0.09 
 (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.16)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.15)  (0.21)  (0.17)  (0.15)  (0.17)  (0.19)  (0.21)  (0.21) 
Dependent population ≥65t-1   0.54***   0.54***   0.41*   0.67***    0.53***   0.51***   0.43**   0.49*   0.54***   0.55***   0.52***   0.51**   0.54**   0.67*** 
 (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.21)  (0.22)  (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.26)  (0.20)  (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.24)  (0.22)  (0.21) 
Capital opennesst-1 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)   (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Trade opennesst-1    0.02**   0.02**   0.01**   0.02**   0.02**   0.02**   0.01*   0.02   0.02**   0.01**   0.02**   0.05***    0.01   0.01 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Real GDP per capitat-1   0.28***   0.28***   0.26***   0.29***   0.29***   0.28***   0.28***    0.26***   0.32***   0.31***   0.33***   0.32***   0.06   0.13** 
  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.10)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.07) 
Shocks in labour demand  34.87***  34.78***  33.40***  33.90***  35.03***  34.76***  34.94***  35.47***  32.63***  34.95***  33.52***  34.83***  37.25***  42.21*** 
 (10.36) (10.37) (10.10) (10.53) (10.41) (10.33) (10.34) (13.34) (7.80) (7.82) (7.78) (12.00) (11.84) (11.96) 
            
   
Constant  78.53***  78.62***  82.08***  75.36***  78.74***  79.02***  81.72***  81.42***  36.84***  69.18***  53.98***  79.59***  75.76***  62.78*** 
 (6.06) (6.05) (6.10) (6.41) (5.96) (5.99) (5.48) (8.68) (11.33) (6.04) (9.09) (7.39) (7.20) (6.73) 
            
   
Number of observations 339 339 339 339 339 339 330 316 395 395 395 281 278 293 
Adjusted R-squared 0.991 0.991 0.992 0.991 0.991 0.991 0.991 0.990 0.990 0.989 0.990 0.993 0.989 0.988 
Rho 0.622 0.622 0.656 0.579 0.623 0.618 0.622 0.608 0.671 0.656 0.670 0.624 0.464 0.458 
Notes: All regression include country and year fixed effects (not presented here); panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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statistically significant. This at least seems to suggest that higher quality stocks of human 
capital as a result of (historical) efforts on education are associated with higher employment 
levels. Moreover, replacing effort on education by indicators on educational attainment leaves 
all other coefficient estimates unaffected except for trade union density, which is no longer 
statistically significant.    
In model 12 we use a different indicator for effort on maternity and parental leave that 
captures more of the institutional characteristics instead of effort in terms of expenditures per 
recipient corrected for GDP per capita. For this indicator, effort is operationalised as the sum 
of the number of weeks of maternity and parental leave, both weighted by level of cash benefits 
received during this period of leave as a percentage of the female average production worker 
wage available from Gauthier (2011). Note that these data are not available for the six Central 
and Eastern European countries, which entails a loss of 58 observations in comparison to the 
preferred model. When using this indicator we also obtain a negative coefficient for maternity 
and parental leave, but it is not statistically significant. Few other variables are affected.  
Due to the introduction of a new international classification of education (ISCED1997), 
there is a break in the series of expenditures on pre-primary education (effort on early childhood 
education) and primary to tertiary education (effort on education) between 1997 and 1998. 
When excluding observations from before 1998, entailing a loss of 61 observations, we also 
obtain slightly different results (model 13). Only for effort on ALMPs the positive correlation 
is replicated, whereas the negative correlation for effort on education is now statistically 
significant as well. Model 14 relies exclusively on public expenditures for all social investment 
policies, including education. It is therefore very comparable to Model 2 but includes 46 
observations less as expenditures on education are distinguished by source since the 
introduction of ISCE1997 only. Although we found that the use of public expenditures instead 
of the sum of public and mandatory private expenditures for effort on ALMPs, care for the 
elderly and frail, early childhood policies and maternity and parental leave did not affect our 
results, we could expect different outcomes when using public expenditures only for effort on 
education. Whilst public investments in education guarantee universal access to education, 
large private expenditures often limit access to (higher) education to those families that can 
afford it, thereby increasing educational inequalities (Busemeyer and Iversen 2014; Busemeyer 
2015). Weisstanner and Armingeon (2018) for instance find that public spending on education 
reduces wage differentials between high and low-educated workers, whereas private spending 
on education increases them. The results for model 14 are highly similar to the results obtained 
for our preferred model presented in the first column. The only difference concerns the 
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statistical significance of effort on education. We now find a statistically significant negative 
association between public effort on primary to tertiary education and employment of the 
population of prime working age. This result could, however, also be the result of the 
substantially lower number of observations in this model: the observations included in model 
14 are largely the same as those included in model 13 for which we obtain highly similar results. 
Although the slightly different operationalisations of our main independent variables 
lead to slightly different outcomes, our estimates for the five social investment policies seem 
quite robust. The signs are always in the same direction, except when replacing efforts on 
education and maternity and parental leave by variables measuring educational attainment and 
the institutional generosity of leave arrangements. When relying on these measures we obtain 
estimates that are in line with the theoretical expectations outlined above. When we rely on 
models purely capturing effort on the social investment policies the positive estimate for effort 
on social investment oriented ALMPs is always replicated. In addition, only in a model with 
substantially lower numbers of observations (model 12) we fail to find a statistically significant 
estimate for effort on care for the elderly and frail. Estimates for effort on early childhood 
policies are never statistically significant, whereas the negative estimate for effort on maternity 
and parental leave is also always replicated in these cases.  
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Appendix 3: Robustness checks using additional independent variables 
In order to check the robustness of our preferred model for omitted variable bias, we estimated 
the model again including additional variables. For convenience we present our preferred 
model in the first column of Table A5 again.  
 In the second, third and fourth column we present the results obtained when augmenting 
our preferred model with our indicators of educational attainment. We follow Nelson and 
Stephens (2012) here who include both attainment and their ‘human capital investment’ 
variables in their final model and “expect the investment variables to operate entirely through 
their effect on human capital stock and thus not to be significant in this equation” (p. 214). Our 
estimates for educational attainment are positive and statistically significant in all these models. 
This is in line with the results from Nelson and Stephens (2012). Besides, the additional 
inclusion of these variables does not affect the result from our preferred model, except in model 
2 where the negative coefficient for effort on education is just statistically significant. This 
might seem surprising as one might expect the effect of some of the social investment policies 
to run through better stocks of human capital. Nevertheless, these findings are also in line with 
Nelson and Stephens (2012) who attribute the fact that their investment variables remain 
statistically significant to the deficiencies of their stock variable. At the same time, their 
findings and the findings presented here could also suggest that some of the social investment 
policies have a direct effect on employment and additionally affect employment through their 
effect on the quality of human capital over the longer run.  
 In models 5 and 6 we augment our preferred model with policies that have sometimes 
been classified as social investments. Some scholars have for instance grouped family 
allowances under social investment (e.g. Nikolai 2012; Kvist 2013). Since family allowances 
concern a mere cash transfer, we did not include them in our preferred model, but when 
including effort on family allowances in model 2 our results are replicated (column 2).31 The 
coefficient itself is negative and statistically significant. This negative association is likely to 
follow from the lump-sum character of family allowances and the income effect associated 
with that (Jaumotte 2003). 
Since rehabilitation services are likely to affect the productive potential of individuals 
they could also be considered social investment (e.g. Garritzmann et al. 2017). In addition to 
                                                          
31
 Expenditures through cash benefits on family allowances are grouped under category 5-1-1 of the SOCX 
database. Effort on family allowances has been operationalised as the sum of public and mandatory private 
expenditures on family allowances corrected for the number of eligible children based on age and educational 
attainment, relative to GDP per capita. 
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using a more encompassing definition of care for the elderly and frail that includes 
rehabilitation services for the incapacitated (model 5 in Table A4) we therefore also conduct 
an analysis in which effort on rehabilitation services is included separately. Model 3 presents 
the results obtained when including a separate variable for rehabilitation services targeted at 
the sick, disabled, injured and unemployed.32 Again, our results are replicated. The coefficient 
for the variable itself is positive, but not statistically significant. 
Although elements of active labour market programmes concerned with availability and 
job-search conditions and sanctions are generally not considered social investment (Bonoli 
2012; Garritzmann et al. 2017), it has been argued that such eligibility criteria and sanctions 
(or ‘incentive reinforcement’, Bonoli 2010) are effective in activating jobseekers. Recently, a 
dataset on unemployment conditionality and sanctions has become available (Knotz and 
Nelson 2015), which makes it possible to examine the role of activation measures. Despite the 
fact that such elements are more likely to affect unemployment rather than employment and, 
additionally, are not considered social investment we decided to include them in one of our 
models as we do not yet know of any comparative analyses using the newly available data. 
Currently, Knotz and Nelson (2015) only provide three average scores related to 
unemployment benefit conditions and sanctions (see for more details: Knotz 2018). When 
using an unweighted mean of scores on availability requirements, job-search and reporting 
requirements, and sanctions rules, we find that stricter eligibility criteria and sanctions are 
associated with lower employment (not presented here). This could suggest that these criteria 
lead some jobseekers to prefer inactivity over unemployment, thereby leading to a lower job 
finding rate and hence less employment. While the positive estimate for ALMPs is replicated, 
several other variables are affected by the inclusion of this variable. Effort on care for the 
elderly and frail and maternity and parental leave are no longer statistically significant, whereas 
we suddenly obtain a statistically significant, negative, estimate for effort on early childhood 
policies.  
Last, we also estimated a model augmented with the net replacement rate of minimum 
income benefits (Wang and Van Vliet 2016; Van Vliet and Wang 2019). Although these  
                                                          
32
 We operationalise effort on rehabilitation services as follows. Expenditures on rehabilitation services consists 
of expenditures on incapacity-related rehabilitation services (category 3-2-3 of the SOCX database) and 
expenditures on labour market programmes concered with sheltered and supported employment and rehabilitation 
(category 6-50 of the Labour Market Programmes database). We correct these expenditures for the number of 
unemployed given a lack of adequate data for people incapacitated due to illness, disability or injury. 
Subsequently, the amount of expenditures per recipient are related to GDP per capita. 
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Table A5 Regressions of employment and effort on social investment policies, 1990-2010 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Effort on social investment policies       
Active labour market policiest-1   0.13***   0.12***   0.13***   0.13***   0.13***   0.12*** 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Rehabilitation policiest-1        0.02 
     
 (0.02) 
Care for the elderly and frailt-1   0.17**   0.13*   0.19**   0.17**   0.19**   0.18** 
  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.07) 
Early childhood policiest-1 –0.04 –0.00 –0.03 –0.01 –0.06 –0.04 
 
 (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Educationt-1 –0.05 –0.08* –0.04 –0.07 –0.06 –0.05 
 
 (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Educational attainmentt-1    0.36***    0.09***   0.21***   
  
 (0.08)  (0.02)  (0.05)   
Family allowancest-1     –0.40***  
     
 (0.12)  
Maternity and parental leavet-1 –0.03** –0.03** –0.03** –0.03** –0.03** –0.03** 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Labour market institutions       
Employment protection legislationt-1 –0.05   0.18   0.18   0.11   0.09 –0.11 
 (0.44)  (0.46)  (0.46)  (0.46)  (0.44)  (0.47) 
Tax wedget-1 –0.12*** –0.12*** –0.13*** –0.12*** –0.14*** –0.12*** 
 
 (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Unemployment benefitst-1 –0.00   0.01 –0.01 –0.01   0.00 –0.00 
 
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03) 
Trade union densityt-1   0.07**   0.02   0.06*    0.04   0.08**   0.07** 
 
 (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03) 
Coordination of wage bargainingt-1   0.20   0.11   0.21   0.16   0.10   0.21 
 (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.14) 
Socioeconomic factors       
Dependent population <15t-1 –0.71*** –0.40** –0.58*** –0.47*** –0.96*** –0.75*** 
 (0.14)  (0.17)  (0.16)  (0.18)  (0.15)  (0.15) 
Dependent population ≥65t-1   0.54***   0.51**   0.50**   0.49**   0.46**    0.50** 
 (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.21)  (0.23)  (0.21) 
Capital openesst-1 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00 
 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Trade opennesst-1    0.02**   0.02**   0.02**   0.02**   0.02**    0.02** 
 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Real GDP per capitat-1   0.28***   0.29***   0.29***   0.31***   0.23***   0.28***  
 
 (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07) 
Shocks in labour demand 34.87*** 31.98*** 35.19*** 33.30*** 31.88*** 34.64*** 
 
  (10.36)   (10.76)   (10.41)   (10.73)   (11.14)   (10.36) 
       
Constant 78.53*** 38.15*** 69.51*** 55.27*** 88.26*** 79.83*** 
 
 (6.06)  (11.09)  (7.01)  (9.45)  (6.71)  (6.15) 
       
Number of observations 339 339 339 339 333 339 
Adjusted R-squared 0.991 0.992 0.991 0.991 0.992 0.992 
Rho 0.622 0.622 0.610 0.612 0.642 0.630 
Notes: 
 
All regression include country and year fixed effects (not presented here); panel-corrected 
standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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benefits clearly constitute passive, compensatory benefits, the European Commission has 
grouped them under social investment as benefits aimed at the prevention of social and labour 
market exclusion (e.g. Bouget et al. 2015). As with unemployment benefits, generous minimum 
income benefits might induce people to prefer welfare over work, thereby leading to lower 
employment. Nevertheless, we do not obtain a statistically significant coefficient for this 
variable. Except for the lack of statistical significance for effort on maternity and parental leave, 
all results are replicated by this model (not presented here). 
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Appendix 4: Robustness checks using different analysis techniques 
Finally, we test the robustness of our results by using a somewhat different estimation 
technique. Pesaran’s test for cross-sectional dependence indicates that cross-sectional 
dependence is present when estimating our baseline model without year fixed effects (CD = 
8.62, p = 0.00).33 For that reason we estimated the models in columns 7-9 of Table 3 again using 
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors instead of panel-corrected standard errors. Besides, the AR(1) 
process is approximated by a finite order MA(2) process. The choice for a maximum of two 
lags in the autocorrelation structure was informed by the Cumby-Huizinga test, according to 
which autocorrelation is present up to two lags (when including one or two-way fixed effects).  
This approach can be considered slightly more conservative as the standard errors 
account for heteroscedasticity as well as cross-sectional and temporal dependence (Hoechle 
2007). The estimation technique, which extends the Newey-West estimator to a panel context 
and additionally incorporates cross-sectional correlations is, moreover, not susceptible to 
deficiencies of covariance matrix estimators that rely on a large T to be consistent (such as the 
Park-Kmenta FGLS estimator or Beck and Katz’ PSCE approach) and typically become 
inappropriate as the cross-sectional dimension N becomes large in comparison to the time 
dimension T (as is the case for our sample). Note that the use of asymptotic Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors may result in overoptimistic standard errors, because the estimator is based on 
large T asymptotics. Applying asymptotic errors to panels of relatively large N and relatively 
small T is therefore warranted (Hoechle 2007). Small sample adjustment is hence applied to the 
standard errors. 
In columns 4-6 we present the results obtained from implementing this technique, which 
can be contrasted to the results in the first three columns (which have also been presented in 
columns 7-9 from Table 3, but note that the order in which we present the models here is 
different). We first present the results obtained without fixed effects, next using unit fixed 
effects only, and finally using both unit and time fixed effects. Model 4 shows the results 
obtained without the inclusion of any fixed effects. In comparison to the model with PCSE and 
an AR(1) component (model 1), most results are similar. The only difference that stands out is 
the positive, statistically significant coefficient for maternity and parental leave. For the model 
including only country fixed effects (models 2 and 5), differences occur for effort on maternity 
and parental leave only, which is no longer statistically significant.  
                                                          
33
 However, when including both country and year fixed effects, we found no signs of cross-sectional dependence 
(CD = –1.14, p = 0.26). 
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Table A6 Regressions of employment and effort on social investment policies, 1990-2010 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Effort on social investment policies       
Active labour market policiest-1   0.13***   0.14***   0.13***   0.14***   0.14***   0.14*** 
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Care for the elderly and frailt-1   0.18***   0.11*   0.17**   0.15**   0.19**   0.30*** 
 (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.09) 
Early childhood policiest-1 –0.08** –0.07 –0.04 –0.14*** –0.04 –0.03 
 
 (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Educationt-1 –0.11 –0.14** –0.05   0.05 –0.14*** –0.06 
 
 (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.10)  (0.02)  (0.04) 
Maternity and parental leavet-1   0.01 –0.04*** –0.03**   0.05** –0.02 –0.02 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Labour market institutions       
Employment protection legislationt-1 –0.40* –0.15 –0.05 –0.05   0.30   0.59 
 (0.24)  (0.46)  (0.44)  (0.30)  (0.63)  (0.57) 
Tax wedget-1   0.01 –0.13*** –0.12***   0.02 –0.26*** –0.22*** 
 
 (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Unemployment benefitst-1   0.01   0.01 –0.00   0.01   0.01 –0.02 
 
 (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Trade union densityt-1   0.03*   0.09*   0.07**   0.04   0.13**   0.09 
 
 (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
Coordination of wage bargainingt-1 –0.51**   0.32*   0.20 –1.58***   1.06***   0.97*** 
 (0.24)  (0.17)  (0.14)  (0.31)  (0.28)  (0.21) 
Socioeconomic factors       
Dependent population <15t-1 –0.34*** –0.78*** –0.71*** –0.32* –0.90*** –0.79*** 
 (0.12)  (0.16)  (0.14)  (0.15)  (0.19)  (0.13) 
Dependent population ≥65t-1   0.10   0.12   0.54***   0.01   0.19   0.58*** 
 (0.15)  (0.14)  (0.20)  (0.10)  (0.12)  (0.17) 
Capital openesst-1   0.00    0.00 –0.00   0.00   0.00 –0.00 
 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00) 
Trade opennesst-1    0.01   0.02   0.02**   0.02*   0.03**   0.03* 
 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Real GDP per capitat-1   0.22***   0.14***   0.28***   0.28***   0.09***   0.24*** 
 
 (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.08) 
Shocks in labour demand 40.54** 50.19*** 34.87*** 35.36 66.72*** 48.16*** 
 
   (18.31)  (14.31) (10.36)  (32.97)  (11.83)  (11.12) 
       
Constant 76.77*** 87.59*** 78.53***   73.23*** 84.65*** 69.01*** 
 
 (4.13)  (5.58)  (6.06)    (3.36)  (8.37)  (8.13) 
       
Number of observations 339 339 339 339 339 339 
Adjusted R-squared 0.982 0.990 0.991 0.532 0.666 0.712 
Rho 0.855 0.634 0.622 n/a n/a n/a 
Country fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Notes: 
 
Panel-corrected (columns 1-3) and Driscoll-Kraay (columns 4-6) standard errors in parentheses; 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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We are, however, most interested in columns 3 and 6, which contrast our preferred 
model and the same model estimated using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. In the latter we do 
not find a statistical significant (negative) correlation for effort on maternity and parental leave 
and unions density, whereas we obtain a positive, statistically significant correlation for the 
centralisation of wage bargaining. Overall, the use of this estimation technique only marginally 
affects our original estimates. Effort on maternity and parental leave is the sole social 
investment policy that is affected. Although significance levels are different, the signs of the 
coefficients are still in similar directions.  
In order to try and focus on longer time horizons relevant for some of the social 
investment policies, we also estimate a few models based on a different estimation technique 
that is able to capture short-term transitory effects and long-term structural effects: error-
correction models (De Boef and Keele 2008). Given their wide application following the 
publication by De Boef and Keele, particularly in the field of comparative political economy, 
error-correction models have been scrutinised in recent years (e.g. Grant and Lebo 2016; Enns 
et al. 2017), amongst others with regard to the issue of unbalanced equations and their 
application to stationary data and dependent variables bound between an upper and lower limit 
such as the employment rate studied here. According to Lebo and Grant (2016) boundedness 
should not lead one to conclude stationarity. Instead, they suggest decision-making should be 
based on testing of the data using unit root tests and estimates of the order of integration. Such 
tests are, however, often inconclusive as they have size distortions and low power in small 
samples. Moreover, results of these test are affected by the choices analysts make with regard 
to the presence of deterministic trends, the number of lags to consider as well as the appropriate 
significance levels (e.g. Choi 2015). Besides, testing is even more complicated for bounded 
time series (Cavaliere and Xu 2014).   
The ambiguity associated with these test is also reflected by our data. The Im-Pesaran-
Shin unit root test for unbalanced panels suggests that all panels contain a unit root (𝑧?̅̃? = 0.58; 
p = 0.72), even when including a linear trend (𝑧?̅̃? = –0.90; p = 0.18). Only when using an average 
lag length of 0.69 in the ADF regressions following AIC the null-hypothesis cannot be rejected, 
meaning that at least some panels are stationary (𝑤𝑡̅̅ ̅ = –2.19; p = 0.01). If series are non-
stationary Lebo and Grant (2016) argue that analysts should closely examine equation balance 
in order to determine whether the estimation of an error correction model is appropriate. Philips 
(2018) elaborates the solutions suggested by Lebo and Grant (2016) by using the bounds testing 
procedure developed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001). This procedure helps analysts to test 
the existence of a long run relationship between the dependent variable and a set of regressors 
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when one is certain that the dependent variable is a unit root but uncertain about the dynamic 
properties of the regressors. This procedure hence requires analysts to establish first whether 
the dependent variable is non-stationary, by using “a suite of unit root tests and account for the 
possibility of periodicity, drift, and deterministic trends” (Philips, 2018, p. 232). However, it 
does not describe what to do if one is uncertain whether the dependent variable is stationary or 
not. Given the uncertainty about the properties of our dependent variable, the framework by 
Philips (2018) is therefore not entirely satisfactory.  
Recently, Webb et al. (2019) provided an alternative approach that analysts can employ 
to test for the existence of long run relationships between yt and xt when there is uncertainty 
about the dynamic properties of all variables, including the dependent variable. Their approach 
builds on the bounds testing procedure proposed by Pesaran et al. (2001) and enables one to 
test for cointegration between the dependent variable and weakly exogenous regressors using 
the long run multiplier (LRM). When implementing the procedure described in Webb et al. 
(2019) we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no long run cointegration relationship for all 
variables, regardless of the dynamic properties of both the dependent variable and the 
regressors. This leads us to conclude that the error correction model is suited for our analysis. 
We estimate our error correction model in first differences according to the following equation: 
 ∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽0∆𝑥𝑗,𝑖,𝑡𝑗 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑥𝑗,𝑖,𝑡−1𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                               (3) 
 
Unlike in our time-series cross-section regressions we do not include country and year fixed 
effects because of the Nickell (1981) bias this would introduce in our model due to the inclusion 
of the lagged dependent variable and our relatively short time series (T = 20) vis-à-vis the cross-
sectional dimension (N = 26). Nevertheless, we do apply PCSE and incorporate an AR(1) 
component for the error term. We impose some restrictions by estimating only long-term effects 
for variables that rarely change (EPL and the coordination of wage bargaining). We estimate 
our preferred model with and without shocks in labour demand, because we believe that the 
way in which this variable was calculated, amongst others by regressing current employment 
levels on its own lags, might interfere with the model specification chosen here.34 We present 
                                                          
34
 Note that estimating the regression in error-correction form entails a substantial loss of observations. This is 
mainly because for several countries the time series are characterised by gaps in the (early) 1990s due to a lack of 
expenditure data on education. Whilst such gaps involve a loss of just a single observation in the time-series cross-
section regressions, they entail a loss of two observations given the specification of variables in differences (instead 
of levels) in the error-correction model. 
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our results in a similar manner as Webb et al. (2019), whereby the first column of Table A7 
presents the coefficients obtained for the lagged independent variables, column two the 
coefficients for the short-term transitory effects, column three the long-run multiplier (β1–α1) and 
hence long-term structural effects, and column four the t-statistics for the LRM used to 
determine whether there is a long run relationship between the regressor and our dependent 
variable.  
The results obtained using error-correction models are quite similar to those obtained 
from our time-series cross-section regressions. There are minor differences between the first 
model and the second model, which includes our variable capturing shocks in labour demand. 
Effort on ALMPs is positively associated with employment, both in the short and long term. In 
line with previous results we also obtain positive signs for the association between effort on 
care for the elderly and frail and employment in the short run. However, when controlling for 
shocks in labour demand the corresponding coefficient is not statistically significant. Despite 
the positive short-term association, the effort on this policy seems to be negatively correlated 
to employment rates in the long run. 
For effort on early childhood policies we obtain positive coefficient estimates as well, 
although these are statistically not distinguishable from zero in the short run. While short run 
labour market effects associated with effort on this policy are likely to follow from parents’ 
ability to reconcile work and family, positive long run effects might reflect the benefits that 
follow from early childhood development. Scholars have for instance found that children 
participating in early childhood education and care programmes develop cognitive skills that 
result in better outcomes during adolescence and adulthood in terms of educational attainment 
and labour market participation (e.g. Heckman et al. 2010; Havnes and Mogstad 2011).   
For effort on education we obtain negative coefficient estimates, both in the short and 
long run. The negative short term association is, however, not statistically significant when we 
do not control for shocks in labour demand. Still, this negative long-run effect is surprising. It 
might be related to the kind of education that governments invest in. Hanushek et al. (2017) for 
instance find that while investments in vocational (as opposed to general) education have a 
positive effect on school-to-work transitions and thereby stimulate youth employment, they 
entail trade-offs. They show that these benefits in terms of increased youth employment are 
offset by decreased adaptability and hence lower levels of employment following technological 
change. Unfortunately our data do not enable us to test whether this mechanism might apply, 
because expenditures cannot be distinguished between general and vocational education. 
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Further, the negative estimates could follow from the use of effort on education as well. As has 
been argued above, educational attainment might constitute a better indicator. When we replace 
effort on education by the share of people aged 25-54 that attained at least primary education 
we obtain positive long-term effects for effort on ALMPs as well as care for the elderly and 
frail, early childhood policies and educational attainment itself (not presented here). We obtain 
no statistically significant estimates with regard to short-term effects of policies related to 
education.  
As for effort on education, we obtain negative coefficients for efforts on and maternity 
and parental leave whereby the negative short-term association is not statistically significant 
when we do not control for shocks in labour demand. This negative long-term effect probably 
relates to the negative effects associated with long leave policies discussed above. 
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Table A7 Regressions of changes in employment and effort on social investment policies, 1990-2010 
 (1) (2) 
 xi,t-1 Δxi,t LRM xi,t LRM t-statistic xi,t-1 Δxi,t LRM xi,t LRM t-statistic 
 
        
Employment rate (prime working age) –0.06**    –0.07***    
 
 (0.03)     (0.02)    
Effort on social investment policies 
        
Active labour market policies
 
  0.01*   0.11***   0.14   20.18   0.01   0.07***   0.11   20.24 
 (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01) (Beyond)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) (Beyond) 
Care for the elderly and frail –0.01   0.17* –0.11 –4.25 –0.01   0.08 –0.08 –4.55 
 (0.02)  (0.10)  (0.03) (Beyond)  (0.02)  (0.08)  (0.02) (Beyond) 
Early childhood policies 
  0.03   0.03   0.39   13.18   0.01   0.05   0.23   12.28 
 
 (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.03) (Beyond)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02) (Beyond) 
Education –0.04* –0.02 –0.65 –16.97 –0.06*** –0.05** –0.86 –27.31 
 
 (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.04) (Beyond)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03) (Beyond) 
Maternity and parental leave –0.02*** –0.01 –0.24 –23.58 –0.01** –0.02** –0.15 –24.30 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) (Beyond)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01) (Beyond) 
Labour market institutions 
        
Employment protection legislation 
  0.10    1.60   14.59   0.02    0.32    4.93 
 (0.09)   (0.11) (Beyond)  (0.06)   (0.06) (Beyond) 
Tax wedge 
  0.02   0.01   0.28   11.36   0.02*   0.02   0.33   20.20 
 
 (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.02) (Beyond)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02) (Beyond) 
Unemployment benefits 
  0.01 –0.01   0.14   16.40   0.01*   0.01   0.13   30.49 
 
 (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.01) (Beyond)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.00) (Beyond) 
Trade union density 
  0.01 –0.03   0.11   20.27   0.01 –0.02   0.09   20.72 
 
 (0.01)  (0.09)  (0.01) (Beyond)  (0.00)  (0.05)  (0.00) (Beyond) 
Coordination of wage bargaining –0.20**  –3.05 –35.11 –0.18**  –2.69 –43.18 
 (0.08)   (0.09) (Beyond)  (0.07)   (0.06) (Beyond) 
Socioeconomic factors 
        
Dependent population <15 –0.06 –0.25 –0.90 –14.65 –0.04   0.10 –0.61 –16.70 
 (0.05)  (1.04)  (0.06) (Beyond)  (0.03)  (0.61)  (0.04) (Beyond) 
Dependent population ≥65 
  0.02   0.21   0.38    9.47   0.03   0.80*   0.39    9.71 
 (0.04)  (0.87)  (0.04) (Beyond)  (0.04)  (0.47)  (0.04) (Beyond) 
Capital openess –0.00 –0.00 –0.06 –12.60 –0.00 –0.00 –0.03 –10.69 
 
 (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00) (Beyond)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (Beyond) 
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Trade openness 
  0.00**   0.02**   0.08   24.76   0.00***   0.02***   0.07   41.72 
 
 (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00) (Beyond)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00) (Beyond) 
Real GDP per capita 
  0.01**   0.51***   0.23   23.72   0.02   0.36***   0.25   25.50 
 
 (0.01)  (0.07)  (0.01) (Beyond)  (0.01)  (0.05)  (0.01) (Beyond) 
Shocks in labour demand 
    69.48***    
 
     (5.13)    
         
Constant 4.72*    5.00***    
 (2.42)    (1.75)    
         
Number of observations 285    285    
Adjusted R-squared 0.554    0.751    
Rho 0.249    0.450    
Notes: 
 
 
The long-run multiplier (LRM), LMSE and LRM t-statistics are all estimated using the delta method and Bewley instrumental variables regressions. The t-
statistics are reported as “Below” when |t| < 1.00, “Between” when 1.00 < |t| < 3.55, and “Beyond” when |t| > 3.55 based on the critical values presented in 
Table 6 of Webb et al. (2019, p. 14). Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix 5: Expanding the dependent variables in terms of gender, age and type of 
labour market participation 
Hitherto we have exclusively focused on employment outcomes for the entire population of 
prime working age. There is however a vast literature that describes that labour supply 
elasticities of men and women are different (see for an overview and meta-analysis: Evers et 
al. 2008). Besides, social investment might yield different effects with regard to male and 
female employment as well. In columns 2 and 3 of Table A8 we have therefore estimated our 
preferred model again using the male and female population of prime working age as dependent 
variables. In comparison to the model for the entire population this shows that the positive 
correlation between employment and effort on care for the elderly and frail holds for the female 
population of prime working age whereas male employment rates are not associated with effort 
on this policy. This makes sense given that women are usually the ones providing care to elderly 
and frail relatives. We obtain statistically significant, negative coefficient estimates for effort 
on education and maternity and parental leave in relation to male employment only. These 
results are puzzling. There seems to be no reason to believe that any effects with regard to 
education differ between men and women. Besides, maternity and parental leave predominantly 
affect the female population, which makes it surprising to find a statistically significant 
coefficient for the male population only, unless cash benefits received by the mother are so 
generous that they allow male spouses to remain at home as well.  
With regard to the control variables, the results obtained for female employment are 
similar to those obtained for the overall employment. With regard to male employment the tax 
wedge, aged and young dependent population, trade openness and real GDP per capita are no 
longer statistically significant. This is probably the result of lower variation in male 
employment rates over time. Moreover, since men tend to be the main breadwinners of the 
household and not the main providers of care, they can be expected to be less sensitive in 
changes in the tax wedge and the size of the aged and young population.  
In columns 4-6 we have estimated similar models that refer to the population of working 
age (15-64) instead of prime working age (24-54). The models are identical to those in columns 
1-3, except that shocks in labour demand relate to shocks in demand for the population of 
working age specifically. The coefficient estimates obtained for these models very closely 
resemble the estimates obtained for the population of prime working age. For the male 
population we now obtain statistically significant, positive estimates for effort on care for the 
elderly, the dependent population above 64 and real GDP per capita. It could be that men do 
provide care to frail relatives (e.g. their spouses) at higher ages (55-64) as a result of which 
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Table A8 Regressions of employment and effort on social investment policies, 1990-2010 
 Prime working age (25-54) Working age (15-64) 
 (1)    (2) ♂ (3) ♀ (4) (5) ♂ (6) ♀ 
Effort on social investment policies       
Active labour market policiest-1   0.13***   0.10***   0.17***   0.15***   0.13***   0.17*** 
 (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Care for the elderly and frailt-1   0.17**    0.09   0.23**   0.21***   0.18*   0.19** 
 (0.07)  (0.11)  (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.10)  (0.08) 
Early childhood policiest-1 –0.04 –0.05 –0.01 –0.07 –0.07 –0.04 
 
 (0.04)   (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.06) 
Educationt-1 –0.05 –0.17**   0.05 –0.06 –0.14**    0.02 
 
 (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.06) 
Maternity and parental leavet-1 –0.03** –0.05** –0.02 –0.02* –0.03** –0.01 
 (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
Labour market institutions       
Employment protection legislationt-1 –0.05   0.58 –0.55 –0.38   0.01 –0.66 
 (0.44)  (0.47)  (0.62)  (0.41)  (0.43)  (0.53) 
Tax wedget-1 –0.12*** –0.06 –0.17*** –0.11*** –0.07 –0.13*** 
 
 (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.03) 
Unemployment benefitst-1 –0.00 –0.02   0.01   0.01   0.01   0.01 
 
 (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Trade union densityt-1   0.07** –0.12**    0.24***   0.06* –0.08*   0.18*** 
 
 (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.05) 
Coordination of wage bargainingt-1    0.20   0.23   0.12     0.19   0.21   0.03 
 (0.14)  (0.27)  (0.26)  (0.15)  (0.26)  (0.21) 
Socioeconomic factors       
Dependent population <15t-1 –0.71*** –0.35 –1.00*** –0.52*** –0.41 –0.57** 
 (0.14)  (0.29)  (0.23)  (0.14)  (0.27)  (0.22) 
Dependent population ≥65t-1   0.54***    0.01   0.99***   1.04***   0.71***   1.31*** 
 (0.20)  (0.25)  (0.28)  (0.22)  (0.26)  (0.28) 
Capital openesst-1 –0.00   0.00 –0.00 –0.00    0.00 –0.00 
 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Trade opennesst-1    0.02**    0.01   0.03*    0.02**   0.01   0.02 
 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Real GDP per capitat-1   0.28***   0.10   0.44***   0.37***   0.24**   0.48*** 
 
 (0.07)  (0.12)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.11)  (0.08) 
Shocks in labour demand 34.87*** 33.54** 35.11*** 26.68*** 29.16*** 23.27*** 
 
  (10.36)  (15.93)   (9.14)   (8.28) (10.46)   (7.63) 
       
Constant 78.53*** 100.17*** 57.79*** 60.36*** 78.84*** 41.89*** 
 
 (6.06)  (9.83)  (8.21)  (6.22)  (9.53)  (7.37) 
       
Number of observations 339 339 339 339 339 339 
Adjusted R-squared 0.991 0.992 0.982 0.988 0.990 0.982 
Rho 0.622 0.590 0.675 0.579 0.610 0.656 
Notes: 
 
All regression include country and year fixed effects (not presented here); panel-corrected 
standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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the coefficient turns statistically significant when focusing on the population of working age. 
For the female population of working age we fail to obtain a statistically significant estimate 
for trade openness. 
Instead of focusing on employment rates, we also ran regressions using labour market 
participation rates. The numerator used to calculate labour market participation rates is different 
from the numerator used to calculate employment rates as it includes both those people that are 
employed and those officially unemployed but looking for a job.35 Labour market participation 
is hence broader then employment. We consider this distinction relevant because social 
investment policies might stimulate labour market participation, but do not necessarily have to 
result in employment increases if the increased supply of labour is not matched with higher 
levels of demand. When estimating regression models of labour market participation rates for 
the total, male and female population of prime working age and working age (not presented 
here), we find that social investment oriented ALMPs are the only social investment correlated 
with higher participation rates. Put differently, higher effort on ALMPs is associated with 
higher labour market participation, but for the other policies we fail to find statistically 
significant effects. 
 
 
 
                                                          
35
 The denominator is on both cases the population of (prime) working age. 
